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The lead article in this issue is Professor Charles Weisselberg’s annualreview of the criminal decisions for the past Term of the United StatesSupreme Court. As always, there are a number of cases that are signif-
icant, and Professor Weisselberg has placed them in context for us. By read-
ing this article each year, you can stay on top of the past year’s key develop-
ments, and Professor Weisselberg also previews the key cases now pending
before the Court.
Our next article is from one of our old friends, Professor David Wexler.
He’s written several articles in the past for Court Review, and we devoted a spe-
cial issue to therapeutic jurisprudence—the
field he helped create—back in 2000. (You can
find that issue on our website at http://aja.
ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/cr37/
cr37-1/cr37-1.pdf.) In his current article,
Professor Wexler makes a rather modest sug-
gestion that could pay large dividends:  Why
not take advantage in criminal and other cases
of the experience of lawyers who help other
lawyers with substance-abuse problems
through lawyer-assistance programs? Give it
some thought, and feel free to correspond with Professor Wexler
(davidBwexler@yahoo.com) about the idea.
Our final article tackles when Miranda warnings may be required in
schoolhouse interrogations. Many schools have law-enforcement officers in-
house these days, and questions about the interactions between those officers
and students are more frequent. Stephanie Forbes, a recent graduate of the
William & Mary School of Law, wrote this article, which was the winning
entry in the American Judges Association’s 2011 writing competition for law
students.
I will close by calling your attention to an AJA-sponsored national sympo-
sium set for May 18 in Nashville—The Politicization of the Judiciary:  How to
Respond. This symposium will address an issue critical to judges today, and
you will have a chance to interact with the leading experts in the area. Take a
look at page 76 and the inside back cover for details.—Steve Leben
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 45 of this vol-
ume (the preceding issue).  Court Review reserves the right
to edit, condense, or reject material submitted for publica-
tion.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact January Serda at (757) 259-1864.
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The building, listed on the National Register of Historic
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steps lead up from a fountain in front of the courthouse
to its front portico. 
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If every court achieved 99.9 percent quality for litigants,
should we be satisfied?  In other endeavors, if 99.9 percent was
the standard of excellence, the IRS would lose two million doc-
uments this year, 3,056 copies of tomorrow’s Wall Street Journal
would be missing one of three sections, and 12 babies would be
given to the wrong parents each day.  For those industries, 99.9
percent is not good enough and it cannot be acceptable for
courts either.  Judicial excellence is a mindset.  It must be an
obsession or, as Aristotle said, “Quality is not an act.  It is a
habit.”
Today being a judge is a 24/7 job.  Judges are viewed as lead-
ers in our community.  We are, in a sense, role models in an era
where it is very difficult to be a role model.  The political
rhetoric of our time has become so heated and polarized that
trust and confidence in courts is jeopardized.
The high-spending judicial races of some states
are problematic but, lest anyone become com-
placent, even in Canada there are instances of
political figures rather unfairly criticizing courts.
None of us should be so naïve as to expect
agreement on the vision or justice we seek.
Judges will and should have disagreements, but
we must have those debates about our vision for
justice in a manner that fosters public confi-
dence.  We need to unify around a common
vision for judicial excellence.
Judicial excellence comes in part when we
provide procedural fairness.  One hundred per-
cent of the time we must insist people in our courts are listened
to, treated with respect, and understand our orders.  Popular
dissatisfaction with courts is fueled not just by rhetoric, but by
performance.  In a democratic society, judges have no control
over political speech that is critical of courts or even downright
wrong and malicious.  But we can control our own perfor-
mance.  
The American Judges Association took a leadership role in
the journey toward judicial excellence when we adopted the
white paper on procedural fairness in 2007.  Four years later a
lot of judges (far more than our membership) have seen our
work and/or participated in educational programs focused on
procedural fairness.  But more needs to be done.
To achieve judicial excellence, we need to commit to getting
judges honest and reliable feedback.  While a very strong case
can be made that the performance measure of procedural fair-
ness should be public, no justification can be made that no data
on our performance be kept lest it somehow become public.
CourTools Measure One for trial courts, developed by the
National Center for State Courts, provides an easy template to
gather the data on the court’s accessibility and its treatment of
customers in terms of fairness, equality and respect. (Go to
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/CourTools/index.html
to look at it.)
Second, we need to learn from social scientists and others
who study our work.  My hope is that next fall the American
Judges Association can be presented with a second white paper
that focuses on how to improve judicial decision making.  AJA
partnered with the National Center for State Courts in a grant
application to the State Justice Institute to fund the necessary
research for that paper, and SJI has funded the grant. If the
American Judges Association motto, the Voice of the
Judiciary®, is to be meaningful, we must speak with authority
and wisdom in our quest for judicial excellence.
Tightening budgets cripple innovation and fear of failure
inhibits risk-taking.  But fear is among our greatest obstacles to
judicial independence and excellence.  In his book The Assault
on Reason, Al Gore wrote:
Fear is the most powerful enemy of reason.  Both fear
and reason are essential to human survival, but the
relationship between them is unbalanced.
Reason may sometimes dissipate fear, but fear
frequently shuts down reason.  As Edmund
Burke wrote in England 20 years before the
American Revolution, “No passion so effectu-
ally robs the mind of all its powers of acting
and reasoning as fear.” Our Founders had a
healthy respect for the threat fear poses to rea-
son.  They knew that, under the right circum-
stance, fear can trigger the temptation to sur-
render freedom to a demagogue promising
strength and security in return.  They worried
that when fear displaces reason, the result is
often irrational hatred and division.  As
Justice Louis D. Brandeis later wrote, “Men feared
witches and burnt women.”
Courts are dynamic institutions—at least they are capable of
being dynamic—but if the times in which we live lead judges
to fear that innovation and change are too risky, we will likely
suffer, but more importantly the communities we serve will suf-
fer.  The judges who started drug courts, mental-health courts,
domestic-violence initiatives, or family-court reform could not
know at the outset that these initiatives would succeed.  In each
instance, there were plenty of skeptics.  But those initiatives
occurred and were eventually successful because the judges
who started them were not paralyzed by a fear of failure.
Decades ago, Robert F. Kennedy said,
There is a Chinese curse which says, “May he live in
interesting times.”  Like it or not, we live in interesting
times.  They are times of danger and uncertainty; but
they are also the most creative of any time in the his-
tory of mankind.  And everyone here will ultimately be
judged—will ultimately judge himself—on the effort
he has contributed to building a new world society and
the extent to which his ideals and goals have shaped
that effort.
We do live in interesting times.  And in Robert Kennedy’s
words, my hope is for all of us that we will be judged and judge
ourselves as committed men and women who sought to build
a judiciary committed to excellence 100 percent of the time.
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1. 1 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011).
2. Id. at 1855 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656
(Ky. 2010)).
3. Id. at 1858.
4. Id. at 1858.
5. Id. at 1858 n.4.
6. See id. at 1858-62.
7. See id. at 1858 (noting that officers may seize evidence in plain
view or seek consent to search if they are a place where they are
lawfully entitled to be); id. at 1862 (officers may knock on a door
and ask to speak with an occupant just as a private citizen may
knock).
Perhaps to most observers, the blockbusters from theUnited States Supreme Court’s 2010-2011 Term were onthe civil side of the docket. Yet the Court did address a
number of important aspects of policing and criminal prosecu-
tions, such as the Fourth Amendment and exigent circum-
stances, Miranda and juveniles, and the Confrontation Clause.
I believe that the most significant criminal-law-related rulings
from the past Term may turn out to be the Court’s habeas cor-
pus cases. The justices issued a series of opinions that interpret
the federal habeas statutes to afford greater deference to state
courts and that make it more difficult for federal petitioners to
obtain evidentiary hearings. This article reviews the leading
criminal-law-related opinions of the Supreme Court’s 2010
Term, emphasizing those decisions that have the greatest
impact on the States, including the habeas rulings. The article
concludes with a brief preview of the current Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The justices issued three significant Fourth Amendment
decisions this past Term. In Kentucky v. King,1 the most notable
of the trio, the Court ruled that a warrantless search of a home
may be supported by exigent circumstances even if those cir-
cumstances were created by police. The other opinions
addressed substantial questions about retroactivity and the
exclusionary rule, and about allegations of pretextual arrests. 
In King, officers conducted a controlled buy of crack
cocaine outside an apartment complex. The seller then moved
quickly to the breezeway of an apartment building. Before
police could get there, he entered one of two apartments off of
the breezeway. Officers smelled marijuana smoke coming from
the apartment on the left. They knocked and announced their
presence and, hearing noises inside, believed that drug-related
evidence was about to be destroyed. The officers then entered
the apartment and found drugs and other contraband. The
defendant, King, was charged with narcotics offenses. But it
was the wrong apartment. When police eventually entered the
apartment on the right, they found the suspected cocaine
seller. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the search of
the apartment on the left was impermissible, saying that
“police cannot ‘deliberately creat[e] the exigent circumstances
with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement,’”
and that officers may not rely on exigent circumstances if it
was “reasonably foreseeable” that the tactics used by police
would create the circumstances in the first place.2 In an 8-1
decision written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed.
The majority noted that warrantless searches are allowed
“when the circumstances make it reasonable . . . to dispense
with the warrant requirement.”3 The exigent circumstances
rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the offi-
cers before the exigency “is reasonable in the same sense.
Where, as here, the police did not create the exigency by
engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the
Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.”4 The Court
did not further explain what it meant by “engaging or threat-
ening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment,” but it acknowledged the “strong argument” that
the exigent circumstances rule might not apply where the
police “without a warrant or any legally sound basis for a war-
rantless entry, threaten that they will enter without permission
unless admitted.”5
The Court also expressly rejected a number of rules formu-
lated by lower courts that have limited the reach of the exigent
circumstances doctrine. Among the rules rejected by the
majority were those that ask whether officers deliberately and
in bad faith created the exigent circumstances; whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics would cre-
ate the exigent circumstances; whether officers had probable
cause and time to secure a warrant; and whether the investiga-
tion was contrary to standard or good law enforcement prac-
tices.6 The key question, said the majority, was simply whether
officers were where they were entitled to be and whether they
gained entry by means of an actual or threatened violation of
the Fourth Amendment.7 The majority then remanded for the
state court to decide whether there actually were exigent cir-
cumstances on the facts of this case, though the Court also
rejected the defendant’s characterization that officers had
threatened to enter without a warrant if the occupants did not
voluntarily open the door.
Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the Court “today
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13. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 2428 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144
(2009)).
15. Id. at 2429.
16. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
17. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2436 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2439.
19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. Professor Orin Kerr, who represented Davis, made a number of
these points in an article he wrote before his work on the Davis
case.  See Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077 (2011).
21. 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011).
arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases.”8 In her view,
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment should be more narrowly cabined, and she faulted offi-
cers for not seeking a warrant when they had probable cause
and time to obtain it.9
Davis v. United States,10 another Fourth Amendment case
with a majority opinion authored by Justice Alito, concerns
whether the exclusionary rule applies when officers rely on
prior precedent in objectively good faith. Many courts had read
New York v. Belton11 as authorizing an automobile search inci-
dent to arrest whether or not the arrestee was within reaching
distance of the car at the time of the search. Two Terms ago, the
Court decided Arizona v. Gant12 and held that an officer may
conduct an automobile search incident to an arrest only if the
arrestee was within reaching distance of the car during the
search or if officers had reason to believe that evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest was within the vehicle. The search in
Davis took place before Gant.
The Court ruled 7-2 that the exclusionary rule did not apply
to this search. The majority emphasized that the sole purpose
of the exclusionary rule was to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations and that prior decisions limited the
rule’s operation to situations in which deterrence was most
effectively served. The Court said that real deterrent value was
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for exclusion and
that the analysis also must take into consideration the sub-
stantial social costs generated by the rule. Acknowledging that
a number of prior cases did not take such a “discriminating”
approach, the justices said that the Court has abandoned an
older “reflexive” application of the exclusionary rule and has
“imposed a more rigorous weighing of its costs and deterrence
benefits.”13 Thus, “[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction
of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield
‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be ‘worth
the price paid by the justice system.’”14 In the case at bench,
binding precedent specifically authorized the search that
turned up the gun, and “[a]bout all that exclusion would deter
in this case is conscientious police work.”15
But the principal argument by Davis and the dissenting jus-
tices was that the case should turn on retroactivity principles.
Under Griffith v. Kentucky,16 new criminal procedure decisions
apply to cases that are pending on direct appeal or not yet final.
The majority turned aside this argument, distinguishing
between the retroactive application of the substantive Fourth
Amendment holding in Gant and the remedy that follows such
an application. Thus, the Court found that the search violated
the Fourth Amendment under Gant, but principles of retroac-
tivity did not require application
of the remedy of exclusion where
the purposes of the exclusionary
rule would not be effectively
advanced. The majority also
rejected the claim that this
would stunt the development of
Fourth Amendment law because
defendants would have no incen-
tive to ask a court to reconsider
Fourth Amendment precedents.
Justice Sotomayor concurred.
She pointed out that the case did
not present the question of
whether the exclusionary rule
applies where the law governing the constitutionality of the
search is unsettled. On the facts of this case, binding authority
specifically authorized the search.
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg. While
agreeing that the substantive holding of Gant applied retroac-
tively, the dissenters argued that the majority’s distinction
between the retroactive application of the rule and the avail-
ability of the remedy is highly artificial and counter to prece-
dent.17 The dissenters sharply disagreed with the broad use of
a culpability test to determine the application of the exclu-
sionary rule. They expressed fear for the future of the exclu-
sionary rule, arguing that if an officer’s culpability is determi-
native and if the Court “would apply the exclusionary rule
only where a Fourth Amendment violation was ‘deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent,’ then the ‘good faith’ exception
will swallow the exclusionary rule.”18 Further, “our broad dicta
in Herring—dicta the Court repeats and expands upon today—
may already be leading lower courts in this direction.”19 And
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were concerned that the Court’s
ruling will make it difficult for lower courts to reconsider prior
decisions.20
Another important Fourth Amendment case was Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd.21 In 2003, al-Kidd was arrested as a material witness
pursuant to a warrant. The warrant alleged that al-Kidd had
information crucial to a prosecution, and he was arrested
checking in for a flight to Saudi Arabia. Al-Kidd was held for
16 days and then placed on supervised release for more than a
year. He never was called as a witness. Al-Kidd later filed a civil
rights action against former Attorney General Ashcroft, alleg-
ing that he and other material witnesses were detained because
the government suspected them of supporting terrorism but
lacked sufficient evidence to charge them with a crime and that
there was no intention to call al-Kidd as a witness. The lower
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federal courts denied Ashcroft’s
motion to dismiss based on
absolute and qualified immu-
nity. The Supreme Court
reversed. Although the case is a
civil rights action and not a
criminal appeal, it contains an
important Fourth Amendment
holding. 
The Court held both that the
complaint failed to allege a
Fourth Amendment violation
and that Ashcroft did not violate clearly established law. The
opinion for the Court, written by Justice Scalia (and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito), addresses the allegation that the use of the material wit-
ness warrant was pretextual. The majority noted that the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry is predominantly
objective. Courts ask whether the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify the government’s actions. “If so, that action
was reasonable ‘whatever the subjective intent’ motivating the
relevant officials.”22 There are limited exceptions where actual
motivations do matter—such as special-needs and administra-
tive-search cases—but neither category was relevant here. Nor
could al-Kidd rely on checkpoint or other suspicionless stop
cases because here there was a warrant issued by a judge based
on individualized suspicion. The majority also rejected al-
Kidd’s claim that Whren v. United States23 established that one
may ignore subjective intent only where there is probable cause
to believe that a violation of law has occurred. The Court con-
cluded that “an objectively reasonable arrest and detention of
a material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant can-
not be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of allega-
tions that the arresting authority had an improper motive.”24
Justice Kennedy pointed out in a concurring opinion some
of the challenges faced by a national officeholder when faced
with inconsistent legal rules in different jurisdictions and
argued that a national officeholder should be given some def-
erence for qualified-immunity purposes. Justice Ginsburg
(joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor) agreed that there
was no clearly established law that rendered Ashcroft answer-
able in damages. But they also questioned whether there was a
validly obtained material witness warrant, pointing to some
omissions from the affidavit supporting the warrant.  
Finally, the justices heard argument in another Fourth
Amendment case, Tolentino v. New York,25 that raised the ques-
tion of whether preexisting identity-related governmental doc-
uments (such as motor vehicle records) are subject to the
exclusionary rule when they are obtained as the direct result of
police action that violates the Fourth Amendment. But the
Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted.26
FIFTH AMENDMENT
The 2009-2010 Term gave us three Miranda blockbusters,
including Florida v. Powell,27 Maryland v. Shatzer,28 and espe-
cially Berghuis v. Thompkins.29 There was only one Miranda
case in the 2010-2011 Term, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,30 but it
was important. The Court held that the age of a minor sub-
jected to police questioning is relevant to the Miranda custody
analysis.
J.D.B. was a 13-year-old student in the seventh grade. North
Carolina officers suspected him of participating in several
home break-ins. A uniformed police officer pulled him from
his classroom and escorted him to a closed-door conference
room at the school. There he was questioned by two officers
with two school administrators present. Before questioning,
J.D.B. was given neither Miranda warnings nor the opportunity
to speak with his grandmother (who was his legal guardian).
J.D.B. initially denied any wrongdoing. After being confronted
with a stolen camera and told by a school administrator to “do
the right thing,” he asked if he would still be in trouble if he
returned the stolen items. The investigating officer warned that
he might need to seek an order sending J.D.B. to juvenile
detention if the officer believed he would continue to break
into other homes. J.D.B. confessed. He was subsequently given
Miranda warnings and acknowledged understanding them.31
J.D.B. then gave additional information including the location
of the stolen items. In juvenile court, J.D.B.’s suppression
motions were denied, and he was adjudicated delinquent. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.  The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed in a 5-4 decision.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor first noted the
compelling pressures inherent in a custodial interrogation.
Whether a suspect is in custody is an objective inquiry that
encompasses two discrete inquiries, including the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation and whether, given those
circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to terminate
the interrogation and leave. Although the inquiry is objective in
nature, the majority rejected the State’s argument that a child’s
age has no place in the custody analysis. The majority noted
that a reasonable child subjected to police questioning some-
times will feel pressured to submit even when a reasonable
adult would not, and “courts can account for that reality with-
out doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody
analysis.”32 Distinguishing Yarborough v. Alvarado,33 where the
justices held that a state court’s exclusion of age from the cus-
tody determination was not objectively unreasonable under the
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deferential standards that apply in habeas corpus cases, the
majority discussed the variety of legal contexts in which chil-
dren are treated differently than adults. The Court held that “so
long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of
police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to
a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is con-
sistent with the objective nature of that test.”34 While age may
not be determinative or even significant in every case, “[i]t is 
. . . a reality that courts cannot simply ignore.”35
Dissenting, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, argued that including age in
the custody analysis would undermine the bright-line nature
of the Miranda rule. Until now, the Miranda custody determi-
nation has been a one-size-fits-all reasonable-person test, but
now it must account for at least one individualized character-
istic. The dissenting justices argued that there was no need to
include this characteristic in the custody inquiry for at least
three reasons. First, because many juveniles questioned by
police are near the age of majority, a one-size-fits-all rule may
not be a bad fit. Second, accounting for the circumstances of
the interrogation (such as questioning at a school, as in this
case) may address many of the same issues without focusing
on an individual characteristic of the suspect. Third, age
always can be considered as part of a voluntariness analysis. In
addition, the dissenters were concerned that the ruling opens
the door to considerations of other personal characteristics.
For example, age may not be different from intelligence, cul-
tural background, education, or other factors and, “[i]n time,
the Court will have to confront these issues.”36 It then will
have to decide whether age is different or “it may choose to
extend today’s holding and, in doing so, further undermine the
very rationale for the Miranda regime.”37
The decision in J.D.B. is quite intriguing for Miranda afi-
cionados. Some may have thought that though it was a habeas
decision, Alvarado foreshadowed a different result. And the
ruling appears counter to the somewhat rote way in which the
justices have tended to assess compliance with Miranda—such
as by permitting flexibility in the language of the warnings,
under the assumption that suspects can understand virtually
any admonitions that cover the legal basics (as in last Term’s
Powell decision), and by accepting an admission as an implied
Miranda waiver, even when that admission comes after several
hours of interrogation (as in Thompkins). In light of the deci-
sions from previous terms, and given the protections that the
Court has afforded to minors in other contexts, it may be dif-
ficult to see J.D.B. as signaling a fundamental shift in the
Court’s approach to Miranda. On the other hand, the dissenters
were surely correct that defendants will argue that other indi-
vidual characteristics of sus-
pects should be treated no
differently than age. It will be
interesting to see how courts
address these and other argu-
ments going forward.38
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Term produced two
more opinions that mine the
Crawford v. Washington39 and
Davis v. Washington40 mother-
lode.
In Michigan v. Bryant,41 the justices considered whether
admission of a dying declaration violates the Confrontation
Clause. Responding to a radio report, Detroit officers found the
dying victim in a parking lot, shot. They asked him about the
shooting. The victim identified the defendant and provided
some details. The case was tried before Crawford, and the state-
ments were admitted. The Michigan Supreme Court vacated
the conviction, finding a violation of the Confrontation
Clause. In a 6-2 ruling (with Justice Kagan not participating),
the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court. In Davis, the justices
held that a statement made during police questioning may be
non-testimonial if the circumstances objectively indicated that
the primary purpose of the interrogation was to meet an ongo-
ing emergency. Bryant provided the Court the first opportunity
to apply this test outside of the domestic violence context with
a victim who was found in a public location and a perpetrator
whose location was unknown when the officers found the vic-
tim. A conversation that begins in an effort to determine the
need for emergency assistance, and which is non-testimonial,
may evolve into testimonial statements, the majority noted.
The trial courts can determine when or if that transition
occurs. To assess the primary purpose of the interrogation,
courts may look at the parties’ perception that an emergency is
ongoing and the type of dispute involved. Here the justices
could not say “that a person in [the victim’s] situation would
have had a ‘primary purpose’ ‘to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”42 Nothing
in the decedent’s responses indicated to the police that there
was no emergency or the prior emergency had ended.  Further,
the situation in the questioning was informal, more like a har-
ried 911 call than a structured stationhouse interrogation.
Under these circumstances, the decedent’s statements were not
testimonial and their admission did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.43 Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
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ment because the questioning
by police lacked sufficient for-
mality and solemnity for the
statements to be “testimonial”
in light of historical practices.
Justice Scalia dissented,
using harsh language (even for
him). He wrote that “[t]oday’s
tale” of officers conducting
examinations of a dying man
with the primary purpose to
protect him and others from a
murderer on the loose “is so
transparently false that professing to believe it demeans this
institution.”44 From the victim’s perspective, his statements
had little value except to ensure the arrest and later prosecu-
tion of the defendant. And, according to Justice Scalia, none of
the officers’ actions indicated that they perceived an imminent
threat. Thus, “[t]he Court’s distorted view creates an expansive
exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes.”45
Further, he argued, the majority’s highly contextualized bal-
ancing test is “no better than the nine-factor balancing test we
rejected in Crawford.”46 Justice Ginsburg also dissented,
though she did not join Justice Scalia’s opinion. She under-
scored the concern that the majority has created an expansive
exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes.
The other case, Bullcoming v. New Mexico,47 was a sequel to
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,48 in which the Court found
that a laboratory report identifying a substance as cocaine was
testimonial within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
Bullcoming involved a forensic laboratory report certifying that
the defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration was above the
level required for an aggravated DWI offense. At trial, the State
did not call the analyst who performed the test and signed the
certification. Rather, prosecutors called a different scientist
from the laboratory. The report was admitted into evidence as
a business record. The New Mexico Supreme Court found that
the report was testimonial but that its admission did not vio-
late the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court reversed in
a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg.
The Court agreed that the report was testimonial. Unlike
the state supreme court, however, the justices determined that
the analyst who was called at trial was not an adequate substi-
tute for the analyst who conducted the test and wrote the
report. Surrogate testimony could not “expose any lapses or
lies on the certifying analyst’s part.”49 Nor does the
Confrontation Clause itself suggest that open-ended excep-
tions from the confrontation requirement may be developed by
the courts. In a part of her opinion joined only by Justice
Scalia, Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the application of the
Confrontation Clause here would not be an undue burden on
the prosecution, and she rejected a claim that the defense
always could retest the sample if it had any concerns about it.
Justice Sotomayor concurred, largely to highlight some aspects
about how this case fit within the test set forth earlier in the
Term in Bryant.
Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent, which was joined by the
Chief Justice, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito. They argued
that whether one agrees with the reasoning and result in
Melendez-Diaz, the majority’s decision was a new and serious
misstep. According to the dissenting justices, the certifying
analyst’s role was no greater than that of anyone else in the
chain of custody of the blood sample. They described the mun-
dane task of processing samples and determining blood-alco-
hol content. In their view, “requiring the State to call the tech-
nician who filled out a form and recorded the results of a test
is a hollow formality.”50
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Term’s Eighth Amendment blockbuster was Brown v.
Plata,51 which upheld a remedial order to reduce prison over-
crowding. Because the most significant parts of Plata relate to
the remedy, as opposed to the underlying violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
I discuss the case in the Civil Rights part of this article below.
In addition to Plata, one other Eighth Amendment case, Bobby
v. Mitts,52 is worth noting. In Mitts, the Court granted the
State’s petition for writ of certiorari and summarily reversed
the court of appeals’ grant of sentencing relief to a capital
defendant.
The jury that sentenced Mitts to death had been instructed
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravat-
ing circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating
factors. Further, if the jury made such a finding, it was required
to recommend a sentence of death. But if the jury found that
the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors,
the jury then would determine which of two possible life sen-
tences to recommend. The court of appeals found that the
instructions were contrary to Beck v. Alabama,53 which held
that the death penalty may not be imposed when the jury was
not allowed to consider a verdict for a lesser included non-cap-
ital offense and where the evidence may have supported such
a verdict. In its per curiam decision, the Court made clear that
the rule in Beck is limited to instructions at the guilt phase.
“The concern addressed in Beck was ‘the risk of an unwar-
ranted conviction’ created when the jury is forced to choose
between finding the defendant guilty of a capital offense and
declaring him innocent of any wrongdoing.”54 The jurors
already had convicted Mitts on two counts of aggravated mur-
der and two counts of attempted murder. They were instructed
that if they did not find the aggravating circumstances out-
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weighed the mitigating factors, they would choose from two
life-sentence options. “There is accordingly no reason to
believe that the jurors in this case, unlike the jurors in Beck,
could have been improperly influenced by a fear that a deci-
sion short of death would have resulted in Mitts walking
free.”55
TENTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court does not decide a whole lot of criminal
law cases with Tenth Amendment issues.  Bond v. United
States56 is worth a look-see.
The defendant in Bond was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 229, a federal statute that prohibits the possession or use of
a chemical that can cause death, incapacitation, or permanent
harm to humans or animals, where not intended for a “peace-
ful purpose.” Bond contended that Congress had no authority
to enact the statute, arguing that under the Tenth Amendment
the power to criminalize this conduct was reserved to the
States. The court of appeals found that Bonds lacked standing
to raise this claim. The Supreme Court reversed in a unani-
mous opinion authored by Justice Kennedy.
The Court first concluded that Bond had standing for pur-
poses of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. She was
challenging her conviction and sentence, her incarceration was
a concrete injury caused by the conviction, and it would be
redressable by invalidating the statute and the conviction. The
Court then decided that her challenge should not be disal-
lowed under the prudential rule that parties generally must
assert their own legal rights and interests, not rest their claims
for relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. The
justices rejected the argument that Bond merely was seeking to
assert an interest of the State. Rather, she sought to vindicate
her own constitutional interests. “It is true that the federal
structure serves to grant and delimit the prerogatives and
responsibilities of the States and the National Government vis-
a-vis one another.”57 But it does more. “Federalism also pro-
tects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that
laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power can-
not direct or control their actions.”58 It is appropriate for an
individual to “challenge a law as enacted in contravention of
constitutional principles of federalism. That claim need not
depend on the vicarious assertion of a State’s constitutional
interests,” even if the State’s interests are also implicated.59
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred but observed that a
court could not decline to consider Bond’s constitutional argu-
ment on prudential grounds. The defendant has a personal
right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—DUE PROCESS
The Term also produced interesting due process cases
involving civil contempt and parole.
Turner v. Rogers,60 the civil contempt case, raised the ques-
tion of whether an individual imprisoned for civil contempt is
entitled to a lawyer or other pro-
tections. The petitioner, Turner,
repeatedly failed to pay child
support and was held in con-
tempt on five occasions. After
completing a six-month sen-
tence, he received a new order to
show cause why he was not in
contempt because he was still in
arrears. There was a brief hearing
in which Turner was not repre-
sented by counsel.  The clerk told
Turner that he was behind in his
payments, and the judge asked him if he wanted to say any-
thing. After a statement by Turner, the judge found him in con-
tempt and sentenced him to 12 months in detention. While
Turner could purge the contempt by paying all of the amount
owed, the trial court made no findings as to whether Turner
had an ability to pay. Turner appealed, arguing that he was
deprived of his right to counsel under the Due Process Clause.
The Court vacated the finding of contempt, though on differ-
ent grounds than Turner had raised.
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer explained that
because this was civil rather than criminal contempt, Turner
had no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The
Court also declined to find a right to counsel under the Due
Process Clause in civil-contempt proceedings, even when an
indigent person is ordered confined to custody. Applying the
Mathews v. Eldridge61 balancing test, the justices decided that
although the interest at stake was important, there were other
opposing considerations, and there were substitute procedural
safeguards that could help protect the individual’s interests.
The opposing considerations include that the other party is
often the other parent, who also may be unrepresented by
counsel. Providing an attorney to the non-paying parent
“could create an asymmetry of representation” that would sig-
nificantly alter the proceeding.62 Moreover, a set of substitute
procedural safeguards can significantly reduce the risk of erro-
neous deprivation of liberty. They include providing notice to
the defendant that ability to pay is a critical issue in the pro-
ceeding, using a form or other procedure to elicit financial
information, and providing an opportunity for the defendant
to respond to statements about his financial status. The major-
ity concluded that because Turner received neither counsel nor
the benefit of alternative procedures, his incarceration violated
the Due Process Clause.
Justice Thomas dissented. Joined by Justices Scalia, Alito,
and Chief Justice Roberts, he argued that neither the Sixth
Amendment nor the Due Process Clause provided a right to
counsel. If the Due Process Clause created a right to appointed
counsel in all proceedings in which detention was ordered, the
right under the Sixth Amendment would be superfluous. In a
part of the dissent joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
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also contended that there was
no basis for concluding that due
process secured a right to coun-
sel in this circumstance under
an original understanding of the
Constitution. And, he argued,
the majority’s analytical frame-
work did not fully account for
the interests that children and
mothers have in effective and
flexible methods to secure pay-
ment.
In Swarthout v. Cooke,63 two
state prisoners with life sentences in California filed federal
habeas corpus petitions to challenge decisions denying their
release on parole. Under California law, the State’s parole
authority—the Board of Prison Terms—“shall” set a release
date for a life-sentenced inmate “unless” the Board determines
that a lengthier time in custody is required for public safety
reasons. The California Supreme Court has held that when an
inmate seeks judicial review of a parole denial, the standard of
review is whether “some evidence” supports the Board’s deci-
sion. Applying Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex64 and Board of Pardons v. Allen,65 the fed-
eral court of appeals found that the statutory “shall/unless”
language creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause and that a federal court may examine whether “some
evidence” supports the denial of parole.66 The Supreme Court
disagreed and summarily reversed in a per curiam decision.
The Court held that the “some evidence” rule is not a com-
ponent of the constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Rather, “[w]hen . . . a State creates a liberty interest, the Due
Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication—
and federal courts will review the application of those consti-
tutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we
have held that the procedures required are minimal.”67 In
Greenholtz, the Court previously found that a prisoner seeking
parole “received adequate process when he was allowed an
opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the
reasons why parole was denied.”68 No more is required here.
The two inmates were allowed to speak at their hearings and
to contest the evidence against them, they were given access to
records in advance, and they were notified as to the reasons
why parole was denied.69
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
Most of the Term’s federal criminal law cases are likely to
interest only those involved in federal criminal prosecutions.
But two cases relating to rehabilitation, Pepper v. United States70
and Tapia v. United States,71 may have broader appeal. They
contain fascinating discussions about sentencing traditions
and reveal some sharp disagreements among the justices.
The defendant in Pepper was sentenced several times for a
federal drug offense. The court of appeals determined that the
district court could not take into account post-sentence reha-
bilitation in resentencing an offender. The Supreme Court
reversed in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor.  
The Court began by enunciating the “federal judicial tradi-
tion” that sentencing judges consider defendants as individu-
als. Pointing to Williams v. New York,72 the majority observed
that both before and after the colonies became a nation,
“courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under
which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in
the sources and types of evidence used” to determine the kind
and extent of punishment.73 Further, “[p]ermitting sentencing
courts to consider the widest possible breadth of information
about a defendant ‘ensures that the punishment will suit not
merely the offense but the individual defendant.’”74 The Court
interpreted a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3661, as consistent
with that tradition and held that a court should not be required
to ignore positive facts about a defendant just because those
facts arose after the initial sentencing. The majority also
rejected a claim that a policy statement issued by the
Sentencing Commission should lead to a different result, espe-
cially “where, as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly
unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing
statutes Congress enacted.”75 Justice Breyer, who had served as
a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, concurred but
did not find the majority’s reference to Williams and a sentenc-
ing “tradition” helpful. He pointed out that a primary purpose
of the guidelines was to bring about greater uniformity in sen-
tencing.
Justice Alito dissented, contending that district court judges
are required to give significant weight to the Commission’s pol-
icy determinations. And, he wrote, “[a]nyone familiar with the
history of criminal sentencing in this country cannot fail to see
the irony in the Court’s praise for the sentencing scheme exem-
plified by Williams” and the statute.76 That scheme had fallen
into disrepute by the time Congress sought to revamp federal
sentencing in 1984. Some language in the Court’s opinion
“reads like a paean to that old regime,” and Justice Alito
expressed his fear that the opinion could be interpreted as
approving a move back toward that system.77
The defendant in Tapia was sentenced to 51 months for
alien smuggling. At sentencing, the judge indicated that the
defendant should serve a prison term long enough to allow her
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to qualify for and complete a 500-hour residential drug abuse
program operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The ques-
tion on appeal was whether federal sentencing statutes allow a
sentencing judge to impose or lengthen a prison term in order
to foster the defendant’s rehabilitation. In a unanimous opin-
ion written by Justice Kagan, the Court said no. Tapia—like
Pepper—is a primer on the move from a federal indeterminate
sentencing regime, in which rehabilitated offenders might be
released on parole, to the current system of guidelines and
determinate sentences. Under the federal sentencing statutes,
the Court held, a sentencing court may consider rehabilitation
in determining whether a sanction other than imprisonment is
appropriate, but the statutes leave no room to consider reha-
bilitation in setting the length of a custodial sentence. Justices
Sotomayor and Alito agreed with the Court’s conclusion but
concurred to express their skepticism that the district court
judge in this case actually had lengthened Tapia’s sentence to
promote rehabilitation. But because the record was not entirely
clear, these justices joined in the Court’s order and remanded
the case.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
As in many years, the Court had a substantial docket of
habeas corpus cases. But this Term’s decisions seem enor-
mously significant with respect to the deference afforded state
courts under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). Two opinions, Harrington v. Richter78 and Cullen v.
Pinholster,79 may well become landmarks. For federal habeas
corpus review of state court convictions, this may prove to be
a watershed Term.
Harrington v. Richter contains two important holdings.
Richter was convicted of murder in a California prosecution.
The prosecution argued that the decedent was killed as he lay
on a couch. Richter’s theory was that the shooting was in self-
defense and that the decedent was killed in a crossfire as he
stood in a doorway. There was a pool of blood in the doorway,
but it was never tested to determine its source, and another
person was wounded at the scene of the shooting. After
Richter’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme
Court with affidavits from forensic experts to support his the-
ory that the decedent was shot in the doorway and the blood
came from him. The California Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion in a one-sentence summary order. The district court
denied Richter’s federal habeas corpus petition, but the court
of appeals found that he was entitled to relief.  In an 8-0 deci-
sion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed.
First, the Court ruled that the state court’s summary denial
was an adjudication that is due deference under AEDPA.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas corpus relief
cannot be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the
merits in state court unless the
decision was contrary to or
involved an unreasonable
application of clearly estab-
lished federal law or was based
on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts. The justices
held that determining whether
a state court’s decision was the
result of an unreasonable legal
or factual conclusion does not
require an opinion from the state court explaining its reason-
ing. Richter also argued that the California Supreme Court
decision did not indicate that it was on the merits. The Court
ruled that when a federal claim has been presented to a state
court and relief is denied, “it may be presumed that the state
court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any
indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary,”80
and Richter did not make a sufficient showing to overcome
that presumption. The state courts or legislature are of course
free to alter state practice or elaborate more fully on the mean-
ing of a summary denial.
Second, the Court held that the California Supreme Court’s
decision was not unreasonable. The justices emphasized that
“[u]nder § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what argu-
ments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported,
the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those argu-
ments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
decision of this Court.”81 While “§ 2254(d) stops short of
imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims
already rejected in state proceedings,” if the AEDPA standard
“is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”82
Under the “doubly” deferential standards of Strickland v.
Washington83 and AEDPA, there was a reasonable justification
for the state court’s decision. Justice Ginsburg concurred. She
thought that trial counsel’s performance was unreasonable
under Strickland but that the affidavits did not establish preju-
dice. Justice Kagan took no part in the case.
Another case decided the same day applied Richter to a
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sup-
press the defendant’s confession before recommending a guilty
plea. In Premo v. Moore,84 another 8-0 ruling, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that the court of appeals “was wrong to accord
scant deference to counsel’s judgment, and doubly wrong to
conclude it would have been unreasonable to find that the
defense attorney qualified as counsel for Sixth Amendment
purposes.”85 The court of appeals erred in finding the state
court’s decision to be contrary to Arizona v. Fulminante,86 since
Fulminante was a case involving the admission of an involun-
tary confession and not the Strickland standard of effective-
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ness. Justice Ginsburg again
concurred, finding an inade-
quate showing of prejudice;
the defendant never said that
had he been better informed,
he would have turned down
the plea offer. Justice Kagan
again took no part in the case.
Cullen v. Pinholster is the
other potential landmark
AEDPA case of the Term with
important implications for
fact-development procedures
and the duties of counsel in a capital case. Pinholster was con-
victed of murder, and prosecutors sought the death penalty.
Before the penalty phase began, defense counsel moved to
exclude aggravating evidence on the grounds that the prosecu-
tion did not provide notice of the evidence it sought to intro-
duce. The motion was denied. The prosecution called a series
of witnesses, and defense counsel called the defendant’s
mother but no mental health experts or other witnesses.
Pinholster was sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed
by the California Supreme Court, which also summarily
denied (without opinion) two habeas corpus petitions. The
state petitions alleged, among other things, ineffective assis-
tance of counsel based on the failure to conduct a full penalty
phase investigation and failure to present mitigating evidence,
including evidence of mental disorders. Although no hearing
was held in state court on the habeas petitions, the federal dis-
trict court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The district court
granted relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme
Court reversed.
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. One question was
whether the federal court had properly reviewed the state
court’s determinations of law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
That provision provides that a federal court cannot grant relief
with respect to a claim due to an error of law unless the adju-
dication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.”87 In Pinholster, the court of appeals had con-
sidered the evidence adduced during the federal evidentiary
hearing in deciding that the state court had unreasonably
applied Strickland. In a part of the opinion that garnered seven
votes, the Court found that this was error:  “We now hold that
review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the mer-
its.”88 “Although state prisoners may sometimes submit new
evidence in federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is
designed to strongly discourage them from doing so.”89
In another part of the opinion, five justices found that the
court of appeals erred in concluding that the state court had
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law to
Pinholster’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Under
Richter, the petitioner can satisfy the “unreasonable applica-
tion” part of § 2254(d)(1) “only by showing that ‘there was no
reasonable basis’ for the California Supreme Court’s deci-
sion.”90 Pinholster could not meet this demanding standard.
The majority characterized trial counsel’s actions as a strategic
effort to exclude the prosecution’s witnesses for lack of notice
and, if that failed, to put on the defendant’s mother. But more
pointedly, the Court criticized the court of appeals for deriving
from prior Supreme Court decisions such as Williams v.
Taylor,91 Wiggins v. Smith,92 and Rompilla v. Beard,93 a “consti-
tutional duty to investigate,” saying that this overlooked the
wide latitude given to defense counsel in making tactical deci-
sions and that “[b]eyond the general requirement of reason-
ableness, ‘specific guidelines are not appropriate.’”94
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but disagreed with
the majority’s construction of § 2254(d)(1), finding that a fed-
eral court must take into account the new evidence admitted
in a federal evidentiary hearing. Justice Alito also noted, how-
ever, that under AEDPA such hearings should be rare.
Justice Sotomayor wrote a lengthy and sharp dissent. Along
with Justice Alito, she would have construed § 2254(d)(1) to
permit a federal court to consider new evidence presented at an
evidentiary hearing. The problem with the majority’s approach,
she wrote, “is its potential to bar federal habeas relief for dili-
gent habeas petitioners who cannot present new evidence to a
state court.”95 As an example, she gave the case of a petitioner
who diligently attempted in state court to develop the factual
basis of the claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evi-
dence. If the petitioner uncovered evidence after the state
court denied relief but before filing in federal court, there may
be no adequate mechanism for the individual to develop his
claim and obtain a ruling on it, especially if state law does not
permit successive petitions. In a part of the dissent joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor argued that as
Wiggins, Williams and other cases “make clear, the prevailing
professional norms at the time of Pinholster’s trial required his
attorneys to ‘conduct a thorough investigation of the defen-
dant’s background,’ . . . or ‘to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary.’”96 “Wiggins,” she
wrote, “is illustrative of the competence we have required of
counsel in a capital case” and “[t]his case is remarkably simi-
lar to Wiggins.”97
Justice Breyer joined in the majority’s construction of §
2254(d)(1) but would have sent the case back to the court of
appeals to apply the legal standards to the facts. He also wrote
separately to explain the situations in which, in his view, a peti-
tioner might still obtain a federal evidentiary hearing.
In the wake of Pinholster, a number of lower federal courts
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have found that petitioners were not entitled to evidentiary
hearings,98 though some courts have permitted hearings to go
forward in limited circumstances, such as to establish actual
innocence or when a state court made no factual findings but
unreasonably applied Strickland and denied relief based on the
petitioner’s allegations alone.99 It remains to be seen whether
courts will view Pinholster as a substantial revision of defense
counsel’s duties with respect to mitigating evidence.
Two other habeas cases are worth noting. In Walker v.
Martin,100 the Court gave further guidance about state proce-
dural decisions that may bar later federal habeas corpus review.
Martin filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme
Court nearly five years after his conviction became final.
California requires a prisoner to seek habeas relief without
substantial delay.  Many petitions are denied summarily with-
out explanation (as in Richter), but courts also often cite cases
indicating that a petition was dismissed for procedural
grounds. While the California Supreme Court had discretion
to reach the merits of Martin’s petition despite any delay in fil-
ing, that court denied his petition with a citation to two cases,
indicating that the petition was untimely. In a unanimous deci-
sion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court found that this
was sufficient to foreclose federal review. A discretionary state
procedural rule “can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal
habeas review” if it is firmly established and regularly fol-
lowed.101 California’s time rule, although discretionary,
instructs habeas petitioners to allege with specificity the
absence of delay, good cause for it, or eligibility for one of sev-
eral exceptions to the time bar. The time rule was thus firmly
established and not too vague; nor did it impose new and
unforeseeable requirements or operate to the particular disad-
vantage of inmates asserting federal rights.
The other case, Wall v. Kholi,102 resolved an issue that had
split the lower federal courts:  whether a motion to reduce a
state sentence tolls the AEDPA limitations period for filing a
federal habeas corpus petition. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),
a petitioner has one year to file a federal petition, though the
time period is tolled during the pendency of “a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review.”103 The Court in Kholi defined “collateral review” as “a
form of review that is not part of the direct appeal process.”104
Kholi’s motion was filed under a
state rule that functionally pro-
vides for a plea for leniency
apart from the direct review
process and thus was seeking
“collateral review” under this
definition.
CIVIL RIGHTS
The Term’s most significant
civil rights case was Brown v.
Plata, which affirmed a three-
judge panel’s order with respect
to medical care and prison over-
crowding in California. I also will discuss two other civil rights
cases, Skinner v. Switzer105 and Connick v. Thompson;106 they
contain important holdings about the availability of civil rights
remedies for exonerated defendants and those who merely
nurse the hope that they someday may be exonerated.
Two decades-old class-action prison-conditions cases were
consolidated in Plata. One, Coleman v. Brown, involved prison-
ers with serious mental illnesses. The second, Plata, was
brought on behalf of inmates with serious medical conditions.
After years of litigation, which included the appointment of a
special master in Coleman and a receiver in Plata, the plaintiffs
moved to empanel a three-judge court empowered under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)107 to order reductions in
the prison population. Following a trial, the three-judge court
issued a lengthy opinion with detailed findings of fact and
ordered the State to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of
the prisons’ design capacity within two years, though the order
did not require California to achieve this reduction in any par-
ticular manner. The State appealed.  The Supreme Court
affirmed, 5-4.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy rejected the claim
that California should have been given more time to imple-
ment other remedial measures before ordering a reduction in
population. The Court noted how long the federal courts
already had sought to remedy the violations. The majority
upheld the factual findings by the three-judge court, its deter-
mination that “overcrowding was the primary cause in the
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sense of being the foremost
cause of the violation,” and the
finding by clear and convincing
evidence that no other relief
will remedy the violation of the
federal right.108 The justices
concluded that the remedial
order was narrowly drawn,
extended no further than neces-
sary to correct the violation of
federal rights, and there were
means of reducing overcrowd-
ing that would have little or no
impact on public safety.  
The four dissenting justices pulled no punches. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, alleged that “[t]oday the
Court affirms what is perhaps the most radical injunction
issued by a court in our Nation’s history.”109 That was followed
with perhaps an even more remarkable statement:  “There
comes before us, now and then, a case whose proper outcome
is so clearly indicated by tradition and common sense, that its
decision ought to shape the law, rather than vice versa.”110
These justices disagreed with many aspects of the majority’s
decision, particularly the issuance of a “structural injunction,”
arguing that the decision “vastly expands its use, by holding
that an entire system is unconstitutional because it may pro-
duce constitutional violations.”111 In a separate dissent, Justice
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, contended that this case
was a perfect example of what the PLRA was supposed to pre-
vent. They took issue with the three-judge court’s factual find-
ings, called the order to release inmates a “radical and danger-
ous step,” and accused the majority of “gambling with the
safety of the people of California.”112
The other two civil rights decisions are important, though
they contain fewer fireworks. Skinner is the “hope to be exon-
erated” case. It presents a question left unresolved two years
ago in District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v.
Osborne113 of whether a state prisoner seeking DNA testing of
crime-scene evidence may raise that claim in a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Skinner was convicted of sev-
eral counts of murder and sentenced to death in Texas. He
admitted that he was present in the house when the killings
took place but argued that he was too incapacitated to have
committed the murders, and he identified another person as
the likely perpetrator. The State tested some evidence found at
the crime scene, but other evidence (including the murder
weapon) was untested. Texas has enacted a statute to allow
prisoners to gain post-conviction DNA testing in certain cir-
cumstances. Skinner twice moved in state court for the yet
untested biological evidence, but his motions were denied. He
subsequently filed a federal civil rights action seeking access to
the biological evidence. The lower courts dismissed his suit,
finding that an action seeking DNA testing is not cognizable
under § 1983 but instead must be brought as a petition for
writ of habeas corpus. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice
Ginsburg, the Court reversed.
The majority first observed that the question was not
whether Skinner ultimately would win but rather whether his
complaint was cognizable under the federal civil rights statute.
The gist of his legal claim was that the Texas post-conviction
DNA statute, as construed by the Texas courts, denied him due
process because it would appear to foreclose new testing for any
prisoner who could have sought DNA testing before trial but
did not. The Court noted the basic test that a claim should be
raised on habeas corpus if a favorable judgment would neces-
sarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. In this
case, success in Skinner’s suit for DNA testing “would not ‘nec-
essarily imply’ the invalidity of his conviction. While test
results might prove exculpatory, that outcome is hardly
inevitable; . . . results might prove inconclusive or they might
further incriminate Skinner.”114 As such, the case was properly
filed as a civil rights action. The majority also turned aside
arguments that such a ruling would lead to a proliferation of
federal civil rights actions seeking post-conviction discovery of
evidence.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dis-
sented. He contended that “[c]hallenges to all state procedures
for reviewing the validity of a conviction should be treated the
same as challenges to state trial procedures, which we have
already recognized may not be brought under § 1983.”115 The
dissenters particularly feared that the decision would spill over
to claims under Brady v. Maryland,116 and they argued that “[i]n
truth, the majority provides a roadmap for any unsuccessful
state habeas petitioner to relitigate his claim under § 1983.”117
If the three dissenting justices in Skinner were especially
concerned about inmates or exonerated defendants raising
Brady claims under § 1983, Connick v. Thompson—decided
just three weeks after Skinner—gave these justices a formida-
ble vehicle to assuage at least some of their fears.
The respondent in Thompson was convicted in Orleans
Parish of two offenses. First, he was convicted of an armed rob-
bery. Then, a few weeks later, he was prosecuted for murder.
Because of the armed-robbery conviction, Thompson did not
testify at the murder trial. He was convicted and sentenced to
death. Years later, just before Thompson was scheduled to be
executed, an investigator made a startling discovery of a crime
lab report that never had been provided to defense counsel. It
turns out that in the robbery case, prosecutors in Orleans Parish
did not disclose that they had a swatch of fabric stained with
the blood of the robber and that the robber had blood type B.
Thompson had blood type O. When this evidence was pre-
sented to the district attorney’s office, it moved to stay the exe-
cution and vacate the armed-robbery conviction. A state court
also reversed the murder conviction (based on the vacatur of
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the armed-robbery conviction). Thompson was retried for the
murder and was acquitted. He then brought a § 1983 action
against the district attorney’s office, District Attorney Connick,
and others alleging that their conduct caused him to be wrong-
fully convicted, incarcerated for 18 years, and nearly executed.
It was conceded at trial that a Brady violation was committed by
one or more of the individual prosecutors involved in the
armed-robbery case. The jury, however, found that the district
attorney and his office were also liable and awarded Thompson
damages. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
damage award, holding that, on the facts of the case, the district
attorney’s office could not be liable for failure to train prosecu-
tors about their Brady obligations. This time, Justice Thomas’ s
opinion was for the Court.
The majority found that under a failure-to-train theory,
Thompson bore the burden of proving both “(1) that Connick,
the policymaker for the district attorney’s office, was deliber-
ately indifferent to the need to train the prosecutors about their
Brady disclosure obligation with respect to evidence of this
type and (2) that the lack of training actually caused the Brady
violation in this case.”118 Connick prevailed as a matter of law
because Thompson did not prove that the district attorney was
on actual or constructive notice of a need for more or different
Brady training, and thus he was not deliberately indifferent to
such a need. Although Thompson pointed out that during the
10 years before his armed robbery trial, Louisiana courts over-
turned four convictions because of Brady violations by prose-
cutors in Orleans Parish, these could not have put the district
attorney on notice. “None of those cases involved failure to
disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or sci-
entific evidence of any kind.”119 Nor could Thompson win by
arguing that the violation in his case was the obvious conse-
quence of failure to provide specific Brady training. “In light of
[the] regime of legal training and professional responsibility,
recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious conse-
quence’ of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house
training about how to obey the law.”120 Justices Scalia and
Alito concurred. They emphasized that “failure-to-train” liabil-
ity is available only in limited circumstances and that a pattern
of violations is usually necessary to establish municipal culpa-
bility and causation.
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. They argued that “the evidence demon-
strated that misperception and disregard of Brady’s disclosure
requirements were pervasive in Orleans Parish,” which
amounts to persistent, deliberately indifferent conduct for
which the district attorney’s office bears responsibility under §
1983.121 The dissenting justices pointed to a number of facts:
the prosecutor who suppressed the evidence confessed to a for-
mer Orleans Parish prosecutor that he had done so, and the for-
mer prosecutor kept the confession to himself for five years; the
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A LOOK AHEAD
All in all, 2010-2011 was a significant though perhaps not
momentous Term, apart from the federal habeas corpus rul-
ings. What will the current year bring? It is still early, but a
number of important matters appear headed for decision
including Fourth Amendment challenges to the warrantless
use of GPS tracking devices123 and to suspicionless strip
searches in jails.124 The justices are addressing yet another
Brady violation from the New Orleans District Attorney's
Office.  [insert fn.  Smith v. Cain, No. 10-8145].  As Smith was
argued early in the Term, it is perhaps merely an hors d’oevre
for the Court. Other more substantial cases ask whether allow-
ing an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA test-
ing performed by non-testifying analysts violates the
Confrontation Clause,125 whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars reprosecution for a greater offense when a jury dead-
locked on a lesser offense announces that it has voted against
guilt on the greater offense,126 whether a prisoner is always in
custody for Miranda purposes when he is isolated from general
population and questioned,127 and whether failures by state
post-conviction lawyers can be attributed to a capital defen-
dant and thus bar federal habeas review.128 Stay tuned.
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Footnotes 
1. REHABILITATING LAWYERS:  PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (David B. Wexler ed., 2008)
2. On a national level, the American Bar Association’s Commission
on Lawyers Assistance Programs acts as a clearinghouse and
resource center. Known as CoLAP, its website can be found at
http://www.americanbar.org/lawyer_assistance.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011). 
3. As an example, for a discussion of the North Carolina lawyer-
assistance program, and a description of their lawyer volunteers,
lawyers known as PALS (those working with addiction) and
FRIENDS (those working with depression and mental health), see
the Symposium on the Lawyer Assistance Program in the Fall
2010 issue of the North Carolina State Bar Journal, available at
http://www.ncbar.gov/journal/archive/journal_15,3.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2011). See also Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside
Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s Willful and Sanist Blindness to
Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589 (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111596 (last visited Oct. 20,
2011. For a discussion of the stresses of the legal profession and
its impact on lawyer well-being, see Susan Daicoff, Asking
Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique
of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 547, 555-557 (1998). For a discussion of the psy-
chological impact of the adversary system and our “argument cul-
ture”—and of the potentially “palliative” role of therapeutic
jurisprudence—see David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Culture of Critique,10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 263 (1999). 
4. REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 193.
5. For an explanation of McShane’s approach to criminal law prac-
tice, see id. at 21, 193-206.
6. Id. at 185-186.
7. Id. at 186-193. The family and community support system, some-
times referred to as the “external  brain,” is discussed in the book
at pp. 191-192.
8. Id. at 193-206.
In my recent book, Rehabilitating Lawyers: Principles ofTherapeutic Jurisprudence for Criminal Law Practice,1 Isought to provide lawyers and other professionals engaged
in the practice of criminal law a collection of practical and
comprehensive materials that could help them achieve better
results as well as greater satisfaction with their clients and
cases. At least one of the contributors to the book also had
some connection to a lawyer-assistance program—a program
that helps lawyers having problems with drugs, alcohol, and
mental illness. Such lawyers are now helped immensely by
such programs in all states,2 and the lawyers in turn have
much insight and experience to offer their clients and other
professionals.  Lawyer-assistance programs rely heavily on
lawyer volunteers, themselves in recovery from a variety of
impairing conditions.  Many begin their recovery due to some
bar disciplinary action, while others find help and assistance
through lawyer-assistance programs voluntarily. Those who
have received help often  willingly “give back” by lending sup-
port to other impaired lawyers.3
These lawyers, especially those subject to law-license disci-
plinary proceedings, are themselves the “recipients” of a ther-
apeutic jurisprudence (TJ) legal approach. Indeed, Dallas
lawyer John McShane restricts his practice to TJ, and one
important area of his work is the representation of profession-
als in license disciplinary matters.4 Other components of his
practice include collaborative divorce and a criminal-defense
practice limited to TJ matters, where he is involved not in trial
work but only in the stages of plea bargaining and sentencing.5
An important section of the Rehabilitating Lawyers book is
devoted to portraying the work of TJ criminal lawyers.  One
such case shows the successful result of an Ottawa law firm
(attorney Michael Crystal and director of therapeutic solutions
Karine Langley) working with a defendant’s mother in can-
vassing the neighborhood and producing an affidavit,with
attached neighbor letters, supportive of a non-incarcerative
community sentence. The neighbor letters asserted that they
would not fear for their safety if the defendant were to live with
his mother, and that they would be willing to report him if he
were in violation of imposed probation conditions.6 Another
essay details how another Canadian lawyer, David Boulding,
an expert in fetal-alcohol spectrum disorder, works with
affected young adult defendants in urging non-incarcerative
penalties and in proposing, with the help of a family and com-
munity support system, truly workable conditions of proba-
tion.7 The final case, to be discussed  in greater detail here, is
a “jailhouse intervention” conducted by John McShane.8
The thrust of this so-called intervention was for McShane,
at the behest of a family, to visit a jail inmate charged with
arson and to try to arrange a conditional bond so that the
inmate could be released to drug and mental-health treatment.
The family had retained a well-known defense lawyer, and they
then added McShane to the defense team because of his repu-
tation as a therapeutic-jurisprudence criminal lawyer. In
McShane’s words, “My job was to intervene with the defen-
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dant, convince him to go to treatment, and then persuade the
judge at the bond hearing to release him on a conditional bond
so he could attend treatment.”9
McShane’s essay in Rehabilitating Lawyers, which contains
copies of his briefs introducing  the court to TJ and to
McShane’s role as a TJ lawyer, makes for spellbinding read-
ing.10 He recounts his several interviews with the jailed defen-
dant, culminating in the defendant agreeing to accept McShane
as his lawyer.11 And, what’s more, the story has a happy end-
ing:  success in treatment, a lenient plea-bargain agreement, a
successfully served probationary period, and, as of the time
McShane wrote, a clean and sober citizen, reunited with his
family, holding a good job, and serving as an upright citizen.
But this case was trickier than it at first appears. For exam-
ple, McShane was initially retained by the family to attempt an
intervention with their jailed relative. The defendant himself
was indigent, so any bond would have had to be paid by the
family. But as a condition of undertaking the intervention, and
because he had the luxury of being in private practice, which
left him free to take or leave cases as he saw fit, McShane
insisted the family pay only a “going to treatment” bond and
not a “getting back on the street” bond.12
Later, when McShane saw the defendant at the family’s
request, McShane discussed the agonies of addiction and
depression, and he suggested that treatment might offer
another way to live. Eventually, McShane offered to represent
the defendant in an effort to be released from jail and to be
transferred to a treatment center. Again, McShane imposed a
condition on the representation, one that the client ultimately
accepted:  his family would only post this bond and stay com-
mitted to it if he remained in the treatment center; leaving the
treatment center against medical advice or being expelled from
it would result in revocation of the bond and re-arrest.13
For our purposes, there is an additional, crucially important
aspect of McShane’s representation: McShane is himself a
recovering alcoholic who, at the time of writing the brief in
this particular jailhouse-intervention case, had been clean and
sober for more than 26 years.14 In his brief, McShane recounts
how he tells defendants—including the defendant in the case
at hand—“how the attorney’s life was almost destroyed by
alcohol and drugs, the availability of treatment for addiction,
and the promise of a rich, full, and joyful life if recovery is
embraced.”15
McShane’s status as a long-term recovering alcoholic adds
credibility to his court pleadings and surely adds credibility to
his work with addicted clients. His conversations with defen-
dants soften their resistance and add to their receptivity to or
“readiness” for rehabilitation.16
The crucial point is that McShane and lawyer-assistance-
program lawyers have a special strength and skill to offer, and
while lawyer-assistance-program lawyers have typically
employed that skill assisting other lawyers in the throes of
addiction and depression, that special strength and skill can
also be of great assistance to a great many people  caught up in
the criminal-justice and mental-health systems. The goal of the
present article, therefore, is to encourage lawyer-assistance-
program lawyers to consider bringing therapeutic jurispru-
dence into their law practices, and to encourage judges to con-
sider the ways in which lawyer-assistance-program lawyers
might be helpful as well.
There are of course many ways of practicing therapeutic
jurisprudence—in the civil as well as in the criminal and juve-
nile-law spheres-—and adding a TJ practice of any type will
likely constitute a service to clients and lead to greater satis-
faction for the attorney. But given the clear link of alcoholism
and addiction with criminal and juvenile issues, the strengths
and skills of lawyer-assistance-program lawyers will likely
shine through more easily in the practice of those areas. Of
course, assistance-program lawyers in long-term recovery
who, like McShane, feel comfortable talking about their per-
sonal histories, will immediately achieve an added credibility
with courts and clients. But lawyers who wish to keep such
personal matters personal may still have much to add:  they
will better understand addiction, alcoholism, mental illness;
they will understand family dynamics, triggers and coping
mechanisms, and attempts at deception; they will  have knowl-
edge about treatments, programs,  services, and much more.
And by bringing TJ into their law practices, they will be ful-
filling the twelfth step of 12-step programs: to “practice these
principles in all of our affairs.”17
9. Id. at 194.
10. Id. at 193-206.
11. Id. at 195.
12. Id. at 194.
13. Id. at 195.
14. Id. at 199-200
15. Id. at 200. For some background about John McShane, see Steven
Keeva, Passionate Practitioner,  June 2000, A.B.A.J., at 56, available
at http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj/pdf/Passionate_
Practitioner.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
16. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Readiness for
Rehabilitation, 8 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 111 (2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=929014 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
Graduation talks given at drug-treatment courts by prosecutors
and judges who have themselves been clients of those courts can
be especially meaningful. See also Alicia Fabbre, New Prosecutor
Says Drug Court Turned Around Her Life; Assistant State’s Attorney
Graduated from Program After Arrest 10 Years Ago, CHI TRIB, Jan.
19, 2011, available at http://www.nadcp.org/ learn/nadcp-news-
events/nadcp-news/-drug-court-participant-assistant-states-
attorney (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). The fact that addiction is an
equal-opportunity disease, affecting professionals from both sides
of the adversarial fence (and judges as well), allows for some pros-
ecutors and judges better to appreciate a more humanistic TJ
approach to the law. For a judge’s story, see Michael J. Murphy, My
Story, available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/
OJFN/resources/murphyM.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). For a
powerful  New York Times article about a psychotherapist giving
hope to her suicidal patients by disclosing her own troubled his-
tory, see Benedict Carey, Expert on Mental Illness Reveals Her Own
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, p. A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/health/23live.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2011). 
17. For a summary of 12-step programs, see the website of Alcoholics
Anonymous at http://www.aa.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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Traditional criminal lawyers can easily add a TJ dimension
to their practice, and that simple “add-on” is likely to be trans-
formative of their practice and their approach with clients. But
as McShane’s criminal-law practice clearly demonstrates, one
need not be a criminal trial lawyer to practice TJ criminal
law—so long as cases are properly and carefully investigated
and creative, collaborative arrangements are made with crimi-
nal trial lawyers to explore all relevant issues and to litigate
cases in appropriate instances.18 Other areas of practice may
require special arrangements with public-defender offices—
where private lawyers may be designated for some cases as
“special deputy public defenders.” These arrangements may be
made in cases of civil commitment of the mentally ill—a par-
ticularly fertile area for performing useful pro bono work and,
at the same time, developing excellent TJ-type skills and sen-
sitivities.19 So too, they can be made in misdemeanor cases20
and in cases in drug-treatment court, dependency drug court,
juvenile drug court, mental-health court,21 and in community
courts.22 In some instances, arrangements may also be made
with law-school clinical programs,23 where lawyer-assistance-
program attorneys might participate and supervise students in
TJ-related cases.
Indeed, these sorts of special arrangements need to be made
not only to accommodate lawyer-assistance-program attorneys
wishing to work in TJ matters but also to open TJ practice to
lawyers in general—perhaps especially to recent law-school
graduates. Since representation in problem-solving courts is
overwhelmingly engaged in by public-defender offices, a young
lawyer wishing to get some TJ experience will be quite limited
in opportunities. Special arrangements with public-defender
offices could allow for a pro bono opportunity for private
lawyers and could thereby help to ease the crushing caseloads
of those defender offices. Further, if the volunteer lawyers are
drawn not only from lawyer-assistance programs but are
broadly based, the confidentiality of lawyer-assistance-program
status may be preserved for those who wish to preserve it. The
next step, therefore, is for interested persons and groups—
including the courts and the bar—to brainstorm about how
these practice avenues may be opened to interested lawyers,
and to provide training, materials, and overall encouragement
to lawyers—those in lawyer-assistance programs and others—
who wish to serve others in achieving a rich and full life.24
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18. For a discussion about how representation may be structured, see
REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 193; see also id. at 131-
132 (noting the need for thinking creatively about the provision
of defense legal services). The issue of TJ criminal lawyers who are
not “full service” criminal lawyers is an important one deserving
careful attention.  One possibility would be for the traditional
criminal trial lawyer to seek out and collaborate with a TJ crimi-
nal lawyer, thereby assuring that all bases are covered for a com-
plete defense and full representation. This type of coordination
would be possible not only in private practice but also in public-
defender offices if certain TJ specialist attorneys were available on
staff—or even on a pro bono basis—to consult with trial lawyers
and their clients.
19. See id. at 207 (comments by North Carolina attorney Robert Ward
about the advantages of representing clients facing civil commit-
ment for acquiring skills important in TJ generally). For one of
the classic articles on point, discussing also the structure of rep-
resentation in civil-commitment cases, see Michael L. Perlin &
Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals
in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 161,
173-74 (1982). 
20. See Ginger Lerner-Wren, Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ)
in a Court of General Jurisdiction, May 2008 (describing Broward
County, Florida, Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren’s use of TJ principles
she first practiced in a mental-health court to a regular misde-
meanor criminal docket), available at http://www.law.
arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj/intj-gc052008.html (last visited Oct.
20, 2011). 
21. These courts are described in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 13-92 (Bruce J.
Winick & David B. Wexler eds.,  2003).  All lawyers might enjoy
serving on occasion as a judge in a “teen court”(if such exists in
the particular jurisdiction), where the judge is likely to be the
only adult in the room. Id. at 50. Presiding in a teen court would
likely be a very non-threatening way to ease into some TJ profes-
sional work. See id. at 49-54.  There are also some court settings
where the focus may appeal especially to certain lawyers.
Dependency drug court, for example, often involves  addicted
mothers threatened with the loss of their children. In some juris-
dictions, successful “graduates” of the program serve as “mentor
moms,” lending support to women currently caught up in the
dependency process. See id. at 41-42. Some women lawyer-assis-
tance-program attorneys—especially mothers once themselves
worried about the fate of their families—may similarly find work
with these clients particularly meaningful and rewarding, and the
clients may more easily open up to such attorneys. For the story
of a teenage alcoholic mother who turned her life around and
became a judge, see Sarah L. Krauss, My Journey from Alcoholism
to Sobriety, Recovery and the Bench, BAR LEADER, May 1996, avail-
able at http://www.tba.org/Journal_Tbarchives/nov98/TBJ-nov98-
personal.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
22. The Center for Court Innovation provides a variety of materials on
community courts on its website at http://www.courtinnovation
.org/topic/community-court (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
23. Gregory Baker & Jennifer Zawid, The Birth of a Therapeutic Courts
Externship Program: Hard Labor but Worth the Effort, 17 St. Thomas
L. Rev. 711 (2005)(discussing the experience of law school clinics
at the William and Mary and the University of Miami law
schools).
24. See text accompanying note 15, supra (quoting statement from
brief filed by John McShane).
A thirteen-year-old boy sat in a room until a law-enforce-ment officer arrived. He asked the boy to follow himinto another room where three more adults, including
another law-enforcement officer, waited. The second law-
enforcement officer then proceeded to question the boy about
his involvement in a series of home robberies while the other
adults encouraged the boy to tell the truth. The boy then
implicated himself in the home robberies, acts for which he
was later arrested. He claimed that as the officers did not read
him his Miranda rights, his statement could not be used
against him.1 At first glance, it would appear his privilege
against self-incrimination had indeed been violated.2 It would
have been, except for one fact:  he was in school when the
police interrogated him.
Miranda v. Arizona responded to concerns over widespread
police coercion when interrogating suspects in custody. Taking
notice of the “menacing” psychological interrogation tactics
employed by law-enforcement officers in custodial interroga-
tions,3 the Supreme Court crafted the ubiquitous Miranda
warnings that devotees of procedural television “can recite . . .
in their sleep.”4 The Court noted that “[e]ven without employ-
ing brutality . . . the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts
a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness
of individuals,”5 and procedural safeguards are necessary to
prevent the “[subjugation of] the individual to the will of his
examiner.”6 The Court has thus far failed to mandate the pro-
vision of these crucial warnings to students during school-
house interrogations. But a recent case illustrates the impor-
tance of providing Miranda warnings to students.
This article will argue that interrogation by a law-enforce-
ment official—including school resource officers—in a school
setting is per se custodial interrogation and requires police to
give the Miranda warnings before questioning students.7 It
does not propose that all questioning of students that has pos-
sible criminal implications requires Miranda; questioning per-
formed by school officials in their administrative capacity does
not require the warnings.8 This article first reviews Miranda
requirements and the present approach of applying Miranda to
the school setting. Next, it reviews emerging doctrine on the
difference between juveniles and adults in the criminal justice
system. The article then argues that the growing phenomenon
of school resource officers as law enforcement and power
dynamics between school employees and students make
schools custodial in nature. Finally, it conducts a case study of
In re J.D.B.9 and concludes that denying Miranda rights to stu-
dents interrogated at school contradicts the purpose behind
Miranda. A per se custodial interrogation rule equitably
resolves these concerns.  
REFINING MIRANDA AND SCHOOLHOUSE 
APPLICATION
Almost immediately after deciding Miranda, the Court
noted clarification was required as to the new procedures,
specifically that of custodial interrogation. The Miranda Court
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1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.”).
2. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself . . . .” US CONST. amend. V. 
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
4. Amos N. Guiora, Creating an Exception to an Exception—Too
Dangerous and Too Unwarranted, JURIST (Apr. 2, 2011),
http://jurist.org/forum/2011/04/creating-an-exception-to-an-
exception.php (Apr. 2, 2011); see also Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting the Miranda warnings “have
become part of our national culture”). 
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
6. Id. at 457–58 (“Unless adequate protective devices are employed
to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of
his free choice.”).
7. Throughout this article, “school” will refer to K-12 schools only.
As most of the students in K-12 will be under eighteen, juveniles
and students may be used interchangeably, but the proposed rule
will apply to all enrolled students regardless of age.
8. “A principal, acting alone and without invoking or outwardly ben-
efiting from the authority of any law enforcement officer may
question a student without complying with Miranda’s require-
ments. A student’s answers to such questions will be admissible at
subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings.” Paul Holland,
Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First
Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 40–41 (2006). For analy-
sis of the requirement of Miranda warnings when school adminis-
trators “act as law enforcement,” see generally id. This distinction
between law enforcement and school administrators acting pur-
suant to their administrative duties comports with New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (permitting reasonable warrant-
less school searches to maintain discipline and safety in schools).
9. 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
Reading, Writing, 
and Interrogating:
Providing Miranda Warnings to 
Students in Schoolhouse Interrogations
Stephanie Forbes
defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by
law-enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.”10 Oregon v. Mathiason11 provided the Court an
opportunity to clarify that definition. 
The officers in Mathiason, who suspected the defendant of
involvement in a home break-in, left a note at his house asking
to speak with him. “He came voluntarily to the police station,
where he was immediately informed that he was not under
arrest. At the close of a 1/2-hour interview [he] did in fact
leave the police station without hindrance.”12 The Court also
rejected the assertion that “[s]uch a noncustodial situation is 
. . . converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because
. . . the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.’”13
Rejecting a per se custodial rule, the Court noted that “[a]ny
interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will
have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law-enforcement system which may
ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime,” and
the mere fact the interrogation takes place in a police station
does not make a noncustodial interview into a custodial inter-
rogation.14 The Court later created a two-prong test to deter-
mine custody:  “[F]irst, what were the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation; and second, given those circum-
stances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”15 In apply-
ing Miranda to school settings, courts have relied on this objec-
tive custody test to justify declining to recognize school inter-
views as custodial interrogations.16
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that police
did not improperly fail to Mirandize a student before interro-
gating him at school about sexually abusing his three-year-old
sister.17 The investigator and principal met J.H. in the hallway
and escorted him to a conference room, “which the court esti-
mated would be about 30 feet by 50 feet,” at which time “[t]he
principal quickly left without saying anything.”18 The court
noted “J. was not restrained in any way. . . . Investigator Gerald
did not say anything ‘one way or another’ about whether J.
could leave, and ‘J.H. never asked if he could leave.’ Gerald did
not raise his voice. He made no threats or promises.”19 The
court declined to extend
Miranda rights, saying “Miranda
focused upon the pressure inher-
ent in the incommunicado inter-
rogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere,”
and that “we cannot conclude as
a matter of law that [J.] was in
custody when the police interro-
gated [him], i.e., that [his] freedom of action was curtailed to
a degree associated with a formal arrest.”20 Several other courts
determined interrogations at schools did not meet the objec-
tive Miranda custody test,21 including a recent case before the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently concluded
“a juvenile who made incriminating revelations to law-enforce-
ment officers . . . was not in custody when he incriminated
himself” during his questioning at school.22 J.D.B., a thirteen-
year-old special-education student, was interrogated by a
police officer in a school conference room about a rash of
recent thefts.23 Only after J.D.B. had incriminated himself did
the officer inform J.D.B. “that he did not have to speak with
him and that he was free to leave.”24 The North Carolina court
held “[t]he uniquely structured nature of the school environ-
ment inherently deprives students of some freedom of action.
However, the typical restrictions of the school setting apply to
all students and do not constitute a ‘significant’ deprivation of
freedom of action,” falling short of the custodial requirement
of Miranda.25 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on
another question26 and ultimately reversed and remanded on
that basis.27 This article, however, uses the case to argue that
given the particular vulnerability of juveniles in interrogatory
situations, schoolhouse interrogations by law enforcement sat-
isfy the custody prong of Miranda. 
THE EMERGING “JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT”
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court has noted that “neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,”28 and
indeed, recent cases indicate an evolving “juveniles are differ-
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
11. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 495.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (footnote omit-
ted).
16. See, e.g., In re J.H. 928 A.2d 643, 650–51 (D.C. 2007).
17. Id. at 650.
18. Id. at 646.
19. Id. at 647.
20. Id. at 651 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
21. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Constitutes “Custodial
Interrogation” Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring That
Suspect Be Informed of Federal Constitutional Rights Before
Custodial Interrogation—At School, 59 A.L.R. 6th 393 (2010).
22. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2394 (2011).
23. Id. at 136.
24. Id. at 137.
25. Id. at 138. “For a student in the school setting to be deemed in
custody, law enforcement must subject the student to ‘restraint on
freedom of movement’ that goes well beyond the limitations that
are characteristic of the school environment in general.” Id. (quot-
ing State v. Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (N.C. 2001)).
26. “Whether a trial court may consider a juvenile’s age in a Fifth
Amendment Miranda custody analysis in evaluating the totality of
the objective circumstances and determining whether a reasonable
person in the juvenile’s position would have felt he or she was free
to terminate police questioning and leave.” Brief for Petitioner at i,
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121). 
27. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406, 2408 (2011)
(holding that a child’s age should be included in the custody
analysis but not deciding whether J.D.B. was in custody).
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
The Court later
created a two-
prong test to
determine 
custody . . . .
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ent” jurisprudence. The
immaturity and impulsive-
ness of juveniles formed the
basis of the Court’s justifica-
tion for withholding certain
punishments from them. In
Roper v. Simmons, the Court
held the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the imposition of
capital punishment on defen-
dants who were under eighteen at the time of their crime.29
The Court observed “as the scientific and sociological studies
. . . tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often
than in adults and are more understandable among the young.
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.’”30 The Court additionally pointed to
state laws prohibiting “those under 18 years of age from vot-
ing, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent,”
as “recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsi-
bility of juveniles.”31 The Court later determined that life
without parole could not be imposed on juveniles for non-
homicide offenses in Graham v. Florida.32 “As compared to
adults, juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility;’ they ‘are more vulnerable or sus-
ceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, includ-
ing peer pressure;’ and their characters are ‘not as well
formed.’”33 The same rationale underlying these decisions jus-
tifies treating juveniles in school as in custody for Miranda
purposes.34
Juvenile Susceptibility to Interrogation:  The Next Step in
“Kids are Different?”
The Court has declined to move from the standard volun-
tariness determination of Miranda waivers.35 But the impulsiv-
ity and irresponsibility of juveniles create a special concern in
interrogation situations. Research suggests that interrogation
techniques—such as those the Miranda Court used as justifi-
cation for crafting the warnings36—affect juveniles more than
adults.37 The risk of false confessions increases with juveniles
as “[t]hey think less strategically and more readily assume
responsibility for peers than do adults,”38 and “are more likely
to comply with authority figures and to tell police what they
think the police want to hear.”39 In one study,
[S]ubjects took part in a reaction time task using a
computer keyboard. They were then accused of pressing
a prohibited key on the keyboard, causing the computer
to crash. Half the subjects were then presented with false
evidence in the form of a bogus computer printout
showing that they had pressed a key they were warned
not to touch. All subjects were innocent, and all were
prompted to sign a confession.40
The study emphasized the special vulnerability of juveniles,
finding alarmingly high rates of false confessions:  78 percent
in twelve- to thirteen-year-olds, 72 percent for fifteen- to six-
teen-year-olds, and 59 percent in eighteen- to twenty-six-year-
olds.41 Although courts may consider age in determining
whether a person voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights,
the Supreme Court previously declined to mandate considera-
tion of the suspect’s age in the custody determination.42 In
spite of this refusal, age is not wholly irrelevant in custody
analysis. The demographic most likely to falsely confess
includes school-age students like J.D.B., and yet courts have
been unwilling to afford them Miranda protections in the one
place they spend the most time. 
The State of North Carolina and its amici in J.D.B. assert the
petitioner’s standard would make age a proxy for location and
29. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
30. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).
31. Id.
32. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Petitions have already been filed in the
Supreme Court to extend the ban on juvenile life without parole
to homicide crimes. Adam Liptak & Lisa Faye Petak, Juvenile
Killers in Jail for Life Seek a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at
A13.
33. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
34. See generally In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 142 (N.C. 2009) (Brady,
J., dissenting) (“The rationale behind these laws is practical and
just. The perceptions, cognitive abilities, and moral development
of juveniles are different from those of adults; thus, the law rightly
takes this into account when dealing with juvenile offenders.”).
35. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (“We discern no per-
suasive reasons why any other approach is required where the
question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed
to whether an adult has done so.”).
36. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449–54 (1966) (describing
common psychological interrogation techniques).
37. “[I]nterrogation techniques designed to manipulate adults may be
even more effective and thus problematic when used against chil-
dren. Tactics like aggressive questioning, presenting false evi-
dence, and leading questions may create unique dangers when
employed with youths.” Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of
Juveniles:  An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 219, 244–46 (2006).
38. Id. at 244; see also Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n and the Am. Acad.
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae In Support of
Neither Party at 2, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No.
08-7412) (“Adolescents are also more emotionally volatile and
susceptible to stress and peer influences.”).
39. Feld, supra note 37, at 246.
40. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of
Confessions:  A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI.
IN THE PUB. INT. 33, 52 (2004).
41. Id. at 53. The missing data for fourteen- and seventeen-year-olds
is presumably an error.
42. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004) (holding in fed-
eral habeas case age was not a proper consideration in custody
determination). But see id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“There may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to
the “custody” inquiry under [Miranda].”). The Yarborough major-
ity opinion seemingly precludes the success of J.D.B. as presented
to the Supreme Court. See supra note 26. However, it does not
impact a decision finding school interrogations are per se custo-
dial.
[T]he impulsivity
and irresponsibility
of juveniles creates
a special concern
in interrogation 
situations.
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make the objective custody test too subjective.43 Refocusing on
the location of the interrogation—school—rather than the age
of the suspect removes this concern. Instead of a juvenile being
in custody because he or she is young, he or she is in custody
because he or she is in school—“an objective circumstance
that is readily observable by officers.”44 The age of the suspect
simply serves to provide a basis of understanding why he or
she may not feel able to terminate the interrogation in school,45
and it justifies the creation of a bright-line rule regarding
schoolhouse interrogations. 
The denial of Miranda rights to students in school hinges on
the objective custody determination:  was the suspect
“deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way?”46
The North Carolina Attorney General flatly dismissed the
assertion that students were in custody for Miranda purposes
during school hours, claiming “the school setting itself is a
familiar one to a student. In that respect, it is less inherently
coercive than a police station.”47 As J.D.B. illustrates, this line
of thought ignores the reality that schools are increasingly pop-
ulated with law-enforcement officials, creating an atmosphere
reminiscent of the Miranda Court’s “incommunicado interro-
gation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.”48
NONCUSTODIAL CUSTODY?:  SCHOOL 
INTERROGATIONS AS CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 
Officer Krupke Roaming the Halls:49 The Increasing
Presence of Law Enforcement in Schools
Concerns over school safety have steadily increased since
the mid-nineties due to highly publicized school shootings
and other violence.50 One response to parental and lawmaker
concern has been the presence
of school resource officers
(SROs) in the educational set-
ting. The Center for the
Prevention of School Violence
defines an SRO as “a certified
law-enforcement officer who
is permanently assigned to
provide coverage to a school
or a set of schools. The SRO is
specifically trained to perform
three roles:  law-enforcement
officer; law-related counselor;
and law-related education
teacher.”51 Although no national numbers regarding SROs
exist, the trend increases yearly.52 “[I]n 2004, 60 percent of
high school teachers reported armed police officers stationed
on school grounds, and in 2005, almost 70 percent of public
school students ages 12 to 18 reported that police officers or
security guards patrol their hallways.”53 In 2009, it was esti-
mated that 20,000 law-enforcement officers patrolled
schools.54 As “‘[l]aw enforcement officer’ means a sworn law-
enforcement officer with the power to arrest,”55 SROs have the
ability to arrest children at school and have increasingly done
so,56 disproportionately affecting poor, minority, and special-
needs students.57 Some research has suggested the presence of
SROs itself criminalizes student behavior, as “discipline prob-
lems traditionally handled by school principals and teachers
now are more likely handled by a school police officer [e.g.,]
a scuffle between students becomes assault or disrupting class
43. See Brief for the Respondent at 25–28, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121) [hereinafter Respondent’s
Brief]; see also Brief of the Nat’l District Attorneys Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9–14, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121) [hereinafter NDAA Brief];
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 32, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011)
(No. 09-11121) [hereinafter United States Brief].
44. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 35.
45. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“[T]he only relevant inquiry
is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have
understood his situation.”).
46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
47. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43 at 36–37 (citations omitted).
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
49. See WEST SIDE STORY (Mirisch Corp. 1961).
50. Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the
Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 280, 280
(2009). 
51. Ctr. for the Prevention of Sch. Violence, School Resource Officer,
http://www.ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/school_resource_officer.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-101 (2006)
(“‘School resource officer’ means a certified law-enforcement offi-
cer hired by the local law-enforcement agency to provide law-
enforcement and security services to Virginia public elementary
and secondary schools.”).
52. Theriot, supra note 50, at 281 (noting the number of SRO pro-
grams have “swelled since the late 1990s,” and “represent a sig-
nificant and popular trend in school violence prevention”).
53. Catherine Y. Kim & I. India Geronimo, Policing in Schools:
Developing a Governance Document for School Resource Officers in
K-12 Schools at 5, ACLU WHITE PAPER (Aug. 2009) (footnotes
omitted), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racial
justice/whitepaper_policinginschools.pdf.
54. Theriot, supra note 50, at 281.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391.1(b)(6) (2009). 
56. Kim & Geronimo, supra note 53, at 8 (“The number of children
arrested or referred to court for school discipline has grown in
recent years.”). 
57. Id. at 9. (“Children of color and students with disabilities are dis-
proportionately represented among these students [referred to
courts by schools]. In Florida, Black youth, who represented only
22 percent of the overall juvenile population, accounted for 47
percent of all school-based delinquency referrals; youth with spe-
cial needs accounted for 23 percent of all school-based referrals.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Peter Price, When Is a Police Officer
an Officer of the Law?:  The Status of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541, 542 (2009) (“[The school-to-prison
pipeline] has had a disproportionate impact on poor and minority
communities and has dramatically increased the number of juve-
niles that pass through the criminal justice system. Ironically, this
increase has occurred at the same time that overall and juvenile
crime rates have declined. A critical component of the pipeline is
the role of police officers in the public schools.” (footnotes omit-
ted)).
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becomes disorderly conduct.”58
Additionally, SROs’ efficiency
controlling crime is question-
able—most violent crimes by
juveniles occur after school
hours and outside of school.59
Regardless of SROs’ effect on
the school violence rate, their
presence in hallways impacts
students’ feelings of confine-
ment and Miranda custodial
analysis.
Teachers Command, and Students Obey:  Power Dynamics
and Custody
The presence of SROs intensifies the inherent power struc-
ture of schools by reinforcing students’ low rank in school
hierarchy.60 In addition to the principal, teachers, and other
school administrators, students must now rank themselves
against SROs, who carry the force of the criminal law with
them.61 Merely by virtue of holding a social position within the
school, children legitimatize the authority’s orders within the
school.62 In determining whether to defer to authority figures,
children “consider the location of the event and whether it is
within the jurisdiction of the authority. In addition, they view
legitimacy with respect to the type of directive issued by the
authority.”63 By giving SROs a place within the school social
system, administrators are legitimatizing SRO authority in stu-
dents’ eyes. Although it is important for SROs to have author-
ity and the support of school administrators to perform their
duties—SROs could hardly be expected to do a good job if the
school undermines their authority—school support for SROs
and outside law enforcement impacts students’ ability to exer-
cise their rights in an interrogation. The unique nature of
school settings only increases the pressure to cooperate with
school administrators and law enforcement, including outside
law enforcement unaffiliated with the school, “to avoid pro-
voking conflict.”64
As courts have observed, “[p]ublic schools have a relation-
ship with their students that is markedly different from the
relationship between most governmental agencies . . . and the
children with whom they deal.”65 Even though the U.S.
Supreme Court has held students do not “shed their constitu-
tional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”66 the rights students
enjoy in school have been sharply curtailed.67 If a student
believes the officer has the support of the highest authority in
the school, the student will be unlikely to believe that he or she
has a choice in whether to speak with the officer without
incurring disciplinary measures.68 “Through the legal doctrine
of in loco parentis, courts upheld the right of schools to disci-
pline students, to enforce rules, and to maintain order.”69 The
power dynamics between school authorities and cooperating
law enforcement all impact the custody analysis by forming the
“circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”70
Follow Me Please:  A Case Study of In Re J.D.B.
The North Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding J.D.B.
was not in custody and was therefore not entitled to Miranda
58. Theriot supra note 50, at 280.
59. OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book—Time of Day, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/offenders/qa03301.asp?qaDate=20
08 (“Juvenile violence peaks in the afterschool hours on school
days and in the evenings on nonschool days. On nonschool days,
the incidence of juvenile violence increases through the afternoon
and early evening hours, peaking between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.”);
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book—Comparing Adult and Juvenile
Offenders, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/
offenders/qa03401.asp?qaDate=2008 (“Nearly one-third (29%) of
all violent crime committed by juvenile offenders occurs between
3 p.m. and 7 p.m.”).
60. Marta Laupa & Elliot Turiel, Children’s Concepts of Authority and
Social Contexts, 85 J. OF EDUC. PSYCHOL. 191, 191 (1993) (“In par-
ticular, it has been found that children view an authority, such as
a teacher, as a member of a social system, that of the school in the
case of a teacher.”).
61. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
62. Laupa & Turiel, supra note 60, at 191. (“[C]hildren judge that
holding a social position in that system is one attribute that legit-
imizes a teacher’s directives within the social context of the
school”).
63. Id. at 196.
64. Feld, supra note 37, at 230 (“Social expectations of obedience to
authority and children’s lower social status make them more vul-
nerable than adults during interrogation. Less powerful people,
such as juveniles or racial minorities, often speak indirectly with
authority figures . . . . Miranda requires suspects to invoke their
rights clearly and unambiguously, a requirement that runs con-
trary to most juvenile delinquents’ social responses and verbal
styles.”).
65. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 607 (2d Cir. 1999).
66. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
67. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (“[S]chools
may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug
use . . . .”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)
(“[S]chools do[] not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the sub-
ject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the rea-
sonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”). Some
Supreme Court justices would go further in curtailing students’
rights at school. E.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 412–13 (Thomas, J., con-
curring).
68. See Brief of Juvenile Law Ctr., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 21, J.D.B. v. State of North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394
(2011) (No. 09-11121) [hereinafter JLC Brief] (“In school settings
particularly, students may place greater weight on the authority of
the adults they encounter . . . [and are] likely to place greater
weight on the authority of police officers in the company of
school authority figures.”). 
69. Morse, 551 U.S. at 412–13 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Teachers
commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on
the power of ideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to main-
tain order.”).
70. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
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warnings prior to his interrogation by a juvenile investigator.71
When considered in conjunction with juveniles’ susceptibility
to interrogation, the school environment is sufficiently coercive
that it warrants a per se rule requiring Miranda warnings before
school interrogations. “A middle school is a restrictive environ-
ment. . . . [M]iddle school students are not free to leave the
campus without permission, and visitors to the school, includ-
ing parents and guardians of students, must upon arrival report
their presence and receive permission to be at the facility.”72
Moreover, the cases cited by opponents of Mirandizing students
do not support their argument. The State misapplies U.S.
Supreme Court precedent and subjects students to the very
dangers the Miranda Court enacted precautions to prevent.
In J.D.B., an SRO went into J.D.B.’s classroom and escorted
him to a conference room where the assistant principal, his
intern, and a juvenile investigator from the local police depart-
ment waited.73 The investigator proceeded to interrogate J.D.B.
about home break-ins while the assistant principal urged J.D.B
“to ‘do the right thing’ and tell the truth.”74 The court denied
J.D.B. was in custody as no one locked the door or restrained
the student, and stated:  “For a student in the school setting to
be deemed in custody, law enforcement must subject the stu-
dent to restraint on freedom of movement that goes well
beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school
environment in general.”75 The court also denied that the
school resource officer’s presence “render[ed] that questioning
custodial in nature.”76
North Carolina argued before the Supreme Court that the
mere fact that students must attend school does not create cus-
tody.77 However, the attendance issue sufficiently distinguishes
school interrogations from the U.S. Supreme Court cases cited
in support. North Carolina cited Oregon v. Mathiason for the
proposition “that a non-custodial setting is not converted to a
custodial one simply because a reviewing court concludes that,
even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement, the questioning took place in a coercive environ-
ment like a police station.”78 But this misapplies the facts in
Mathiason. The Court in Mathiason placed great emphasis on
the fact that the defendant “came voluntarily to the police sta-
tion, where he was immediately informed that he was not under
arrest. . . . It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in
custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any sig-
nificant way.”79 Mathiason had a
choice in going to the police sta-
tion that students do not have in
attending school:  “[t]he penal-
ties for failure to attend school
can be severe:  a youth can be
detained, declared a ward of the
court, or have criminal liability
and even jail time imposed on
his or her parents.”80
Assuming arguendo that
J.D.B.’s mere presence in school did not render him in custody,
his removal to the conference room surely did. J.D.B. was
removed from his classroom by a certified law-enforcement offi-
cer and escorted to a room containing another law-enforcement
officer and two school administrators, whom the student is
socialized to obey.81 As Justice Kagan noted in oral argument:
“Do we need either imaginative powers or empirical data to
know that when a 13-year-old is brought into a room in his
school, taken out of class, four people are there, two are police
officers, one is assistant principal, threatened with custody, that
that person is not going to feel free to take off and leave?”82
“The only logical reason for [the SRO] to escort J.D.B. was to
restrain his freedom of movement; J.D.B. had no choice but to
comply with his removal from the classroom. . . . Therefore,
J.D.B.’s freedom of movement was restricted from the moment
he was removed from his classroom . . . .”83 Although “the
school setting itself is a familiar one to a student,”84 adminis-
trative conference rooms likely are not.  
Adopting this line of reasoning would severely prejudice stu-
dents’ rights by implying schools are “safe zones” for police
interrogations. If being taken out of class by an uniformed offi-
cer and held in a room by the authority figures of the school
and outside law enforcement is not “‘restraint on freedom of
movement’ that goes well beyond the limitations that are char-
acteristic of the school environment in general,”85 it seems
unlikely any questioning in schools could ever be considered
custodial interrogation under Miranda. Indeed, this appears to
be the position Justice Scalia took in oral argument:  because
71. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2394 (2011).
72. Id. at 143 (Brady, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. at 138–39 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 144 (Brady, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 138 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 139.
77. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 36 (“Even if this Court were
to consider the setting in which the statements in this case were
made, the questioning of petitioner by law enforcement officers in
a school setting did not make the interview custodial.”); see also
United States Brief, supra note 43, at 33 (“The Court has, for
example, held that the far more restrictive environment of incar-
ceration to serve a sentence in a prison does not automatically
constitute ‘custody’ for Miranda purposes, although additional
restraints in a prison interview may amount to ‘custody.’”).
78. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 36 (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam)).
79. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
80. JLC Brief, supra note 64, at 15–16. 
81. Laupa & Turiel, supra note 60, at 196 (“[T]he principal is gener-
ally seen by children as the highest authority in the school.”).
82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.
Ct. 2394 (2011) (09-11121), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-11121.pdf
[hereinafter Oral Argument]; see also In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135,
143–44 (Brady, J., dissenting) (N.C. 2009) (“That a special inves-
tigator from the police department . . . was making a special trip
to the school would alert any reasonable middle school student
that something serious was taking place . . . .”).
83. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 143–44 (Brady, J., dissenting).
84. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 36–37.
85. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting State v. Buchanan, 543
S.E.2d 823, 827 (N.C. 2001)). 
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86. Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 33 (statement of J. Scalia).
87. See id. at 33 (statement of J. Ginsburg) (“This seventh grader was
marched by the school security officer, taken away from his peers,
from his class in—put in a room with a closed door with the assis-
tant principal. That is not a normal part of the school day. That’s
not where he is required to be.”).
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 466 (“Without the protections flowing from adequate
warning and the rights of counsel, ‘all the careful safeguards
erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or
any other witness, would become empty formalities in a proce-
dure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a con-
fession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised
pleasure of the police.’” (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
91. Id. at 449–50; see also In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 143 (N.C.
2009) (Brady, J., dissenting), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (“Law
enforcement in the instant case took advantage of the middle
school’s restrictive environment and its psychological effect by
choosing to interrogate J.D.B. there, instead of at his home or in
any other public, more neutral location.”).
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
93. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (“[W]e have
held that the constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings, and that the rights of students must be applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment.”) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
94. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
school environment, where juveniles are faced with a variety of
negative consequences—including potential criminal charges—for
refusing to comply with the requests or commands of authority fig-
ures, the circumstances are inherently more coercive and require
more, not less, careful protection of the rights of the juvenile.”). 
students are required to attend
school and obey teacher direc-
tives, students are never in cus-
tody. He stated:  
[T]he additional coer-
cive effect of not being able
to leave [the conference
room] probably didn’t make
a whole lot of difference. He
knew he was stuck where
his parents had put him, in
the school. And if the
school sent him to a class-
room, he had to be in the classroom; and if the school
sent him to a place where he could, if he wished, volun-
tarily speak to the police officers, he had to be there.86
This assertion is absurd. There is certainly a difference
between being required to be in a classroom learning and being
required to accompany a uniformed police officer to go speak
with the assistant principal and another law-enforcement offi-
cer. One is an everyday occurrence; the other presumably is
not.87 The court’s determination that J.D.B. was not in custody,
and was therefore not entitled to notice of his rights, ignores
the reality of schools’ restrictive nature, the relationships
between officials and students, and the interrogation in ques-
tion. Moreover, the denial of Miranda rights to students inter-
rogated by police at school contradicts the very purpose of the
Miranda warnings.
Upholding the Very Danger Miranda Sought To Prevent
The removal of a suspect from familiar surroundings (class-
rooms) and forcing him “into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
[running him] through menacing police interrogation proce-
dures” is the exact kind of psychological coercion that the
Miranda warnings were designed to thwart.88 At no time did
any of the four adults in J.D.B.’s case “undertake to afford
appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to
insure that the statements were truly the product of free
choice.”89 The withholding from students of knowledge about
the right not to incriminate themselves forces them to become
complicit in their own prosecutions.90
Additionally, the choice to interrogate in school rather than
at home, especially in offenses occurring off school grounds,
demonstrates the same kind of psychological manipulation the
Miranda Court warned against:  “The subject should be
deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he
may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly
aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions
of criminal behavior within the walls of his home.”91 Placing a
student in a situation where he or she has no advocate, indeed
cannot secure one due to his or her lack of knowledge of the
right to have one, isolates him or her. In fact, the Court noted
isolation was the key feature of coercive interrogations:  “To be
alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to
deprive him of any outside support.”92 To prevent the wholesale
dismantling of students’ Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, there must be a per se rule of custodial inter-
rogation and Miranda warnings. 
No Miranda-Free Zones:  Justifications for a Per Se
Miranda Rule in Schools
The recognition of required Miranda warnings when stu-
dents are interrogated by law enforcement in school protects
students’ rights and provides a bright-line rule for school offi-
cials and law enforcement. Moreover, by limiting it to the
school setting, it does not unduly burden law enforcement.
Logic dictates that if courts take the special nature of the school
environment into account in order to restrict some constitu-
tional rights,93 then courts should also take the school environ-
ment into account to strengthen other constitutional rights. 
The susceptibility of juveniles to police interrogation tech-
niques and the inherent power structure of schools require
Miranda warnings to ensure police do not take advantage of
students’ deference to authority.94 If school interrogation is not
per se custodial, then schools risk becoming a free zone for
officers to interrogate students. Armed with the knowledge
Miranda cannot enter the school, police would choose to speak
to students in schools to avoid warning students of their rights
and risking possible interference by parents or other advo-
[T]he choice to
interrogate in
school . . .
demonstrates the
same kind of 
psychological
manipulation the
Miranda Court
warned against.
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95. For example in Greene v. Camreta, a social worker chose to ques-
tion an elementary school student, allegedly sexually abused, at
school “because it is a place where children feel safe and would
allow him ‘to conduct the interview away from the potential influ-
ence of suspects, including parents.’” 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2009), vacated as moot by 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
96. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 143 (Brady, J., dissenting).
97. Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 38 (statement of J. Breyer)
(“Now, what happens to destroy the criminal justice system? You
can see from my overstatement, I tend to suspect nothing, but you
tell me.”). 
98. Id. (statement of N.C. Att’y Gen. Roy Cooper).
99. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
100. See generally Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43. See also
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004) (“The Miranda
custody inquiry is an objective test. . . . The objective test fur-
thers ‘the clarity of [Miranda’s] rule,’ ensuring that the police do
not need ‘to make guesses as to [the circumstances] at issue
before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect.’” (quoting
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (alterations in
original) (citation omitted))).
101. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (holding there is
a “public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warn-
ings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into
evidence”).
102. Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police
Executives Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 925 (2007).
103. See generally Shields, supra note 21.
104. Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 24–25 (statement of Barbara S.
Blackman, Attorney of Record for the Petitioner). 
105. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“This was the
spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the man-
ner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be
enforced against overzealous police practices. It was necessary
. . . to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had
not become but a ‘form of words’ . . . in the hands of government
officials.” (internal citation omitted)).
cates.95 “It is troubling that . . . a public middle school, which
should be an environment where children feel safe and pro-
tected, [could become] a place where a law-enforcement inves-
tigator claim[s] a tactical advantage over a juvenile.”96
Recognizing a right to receive Miranda warnings from law
enforcement before school interrogations would protect stu-
dents’ rights and would not come at the expense of law-
enforcement goals nor needlessly restrict school administra-
tors’ abilities to enforce school rules. 
Mirandizing students will not “destroy the criminal justice
system.”97 North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper
asserted in oral argument that “under [J.D.B.’s] theory, a school
resource officer who is going to take a juvenile into a room to
talk about a stolen cell phone or bullying, the first thing that
he’s got to say is you have the right to remain silent. Now, that,
in my opinion, disrupts the communication.”98 However the
Court has previously noted: 
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive
if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on
the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their
constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should
have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult
with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise,
these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
then there is something very wrong with that system.99
Police should not be able to claim students should not
know of their rights because they may choose to invoke them.
The limitation of this per se rule to school settings would also
prevent subjective factors from entering into the objective cus-
tody determination.
The main concern over extending the Miranda custody rule
to consider age is that it would completely dismantle Miranda’s
objective custody determination.100 By linking the determina-
tion to location instead of age, this fear is unfounded. The stan-
dard is completely objective:  the student is either in school or
not. It would not create a “Miranda minor” rule, mandating
different warnings for all K-12 students in all situations.
Students in school would receive the standard Miranda warn-
ings, the standard for determining voluntariness of any waiver
would remain the same, and a public safety exception could be
read into this rule as it has been in Miranda.101 A per se custo-
dial interrogation rule for schools will balance law enforce-
ment needs without sacrificing notice to students of their con-
stitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The purpose behind Miranda was to provide clear guidance
to law-enforcement officers as to procedure to ensure people
could make informed decisions before waiving their rights.
Unfortunately, “police have complied more with the letter than
with the spirit of Miranda.”102 As the J.D.B. case and others like
it illustrate,103 law-enforcement officers engage in psychologi-
cally intimidating interrogation without taking the small step of
informing students of their right not to incriminate themselves.
“[W]e can’t simply say ‘we’re not going to do anything. We are
not going to tell these children that they don’t have to cooperate
with the State in building a case against themselves.’”104 The
time has come for the recognition of a per se custodial interro-
gation rule when students are questioned by law enforcement at
school. Failing to do so would give law-enforcement officers
carte blanche to question students at school. The special nature
of schools creates the intimidating atmosphere that so con-
cerned the Miranda court. There must be a bright-line rule to
prevent students’ privilege against self-incrimination from
becoming a right in name only.105
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AN AJA NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
The Politicization of the Judiciary:
How to Respond
Friday, May 18, 2012
DoubleTree by Hilton Hotel,
Nashville Downtown
Nashville, Tennessee
Conference Registration Fee:  $195
(Hotel:  $129/night)
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/conferences/
index.html
As part of the AJA’s midyear meet-
ing, we’re presenting a national sym-
posium—The Politicization of the
Judiciary:  How to Respond. The full-
day program offers a who’s who of
the most knowledgeable experts on
judicial elections.
To maintain judicial indepen-
dence, judges must understand how
to defend their judicial decisions in
an increasingly political, money-dri-
ven environment. In 2010, several
justices and judges lost their jobs
after organized campaigns against
them. This is an environment in
which judicial decisions may be
viewed from the vantage point of
third parties who represent particu-
lar viewpoints:
• Nearly one-third of all funds spent
on state high-court elections in
the 2010 election cycle came from
noncandidate groups.
• Nearly 40% of all funds spent on
state high-court elections came
from just 10 groups, including
national special-interest groups
and political parties.
• Outside groups were responsible
for three in four attack ads.
The symposium will present an
informative conversation about these
issues—with ample participation by
judges in attendance—and provide
tools for responding to challenges to
a fair and impartial judiciary. You
will have the chance to discuss your
own personal experiences with pan-
elists and other attendees as we work
together to consider these chal-
lenges.
The speakers are the most knowl-
edgeable people anywhere regarding
judicial elections:
• Alaska Supreme Court Justice
Dana Fabe, who withstood a
strong challenge (focused in part
on her ruling in an abortion case)
in 2010;
• Former Iowa Supreme Court
Justice Michael Streit, who lost his
retention election in 2010 after an
ouster campaign focused on the
court’s ruling on same-sex mar-
riage;
• Professor James Gibson
(Washington University in St.
Louis), the leading expert in acad-
emic circles on judicial campaigns
and elections; 
• Mark White, chair of the ABA Ad
Hoc Committee on Judicial
Campaign Oversight;
• Philip Nichols and Mark Grebner,
two campaign consultants who
have assisted judges at all levels in
elections throughout the United
States;
• K.O. Myers, Director of Research
and Programs with the American
Judicature Society.
The American Judges Association
invites your participation in this
symposium. Note:  Space is limited
and early registration is advised!
Attendees at the Friday sympo-
sium are also welcome to attend the
AJA Board of Governors meeting on
Saturday morning. We hope to see
you this May in Nashville.
o
WEBSITES OF INTEREST
The AJA Blog
http://blog.amjudges.org
Court Review is published quarterly,
but events of interest to judges happen all
the time. Current AJA President Kevin
Burke has started a blog that fills the gap.
Almost anything that’s important to
judges is likely to be touched on in the
blog, often with links to new reports, arti-
cles of interest, or other websites with
more information. 
Recent blog entries have included:
• Updates on the court-funding crisis,
with links to commentaries about
problems in funding courts in Florida,
New York, and Canada (including a
speech by Chief Justice Robert
Bauman of the Supreme Court of
British Columbia).
• A summary of a new report from
Justice at Stake, The New Politics of
Judicial Elections 2009-2010, which
found that the rise in noncandidate TV
advertising made the 2010 election
cycle the costliest nonpresidential
election ever for TV spending in judi-
cial elections. The blog provided a link
for downloading the report, as well as
a separate link to a Joyce Foundation
report on money and politics.
• A report of a recent speech by Florida
Bar President Scott G. Hawkins, who
suggested that justices of the Florida
Supreme Court may be targeted by
opposition groups in 2012. 
• Notice of a new working group on
improving judicial decisions about
pretrial release in criminal cases, com-
bined with contact information for
those who want to follow the federally
funded project.
• A three-step action plan for reducing
the chance that a rampant rumor mill
will take over your courthouse.
• Guest commentaries, including ones
on judicial wellness and court leader-
ship.
The Resource Page
g
